cameleer-server/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-25-license-enforcement-design.md

# License Enforcement — Design

**Date:** 2026-04-25
**Status:** Approved (brainstorm); pending writing-plans
**Related:** cameleer-saas#7 (Epic: License & Feature Gating), cameleer-saas#42 (vendor minting), cameleer-saas#50 (customer license view)

## Problem

`cameleer-server` ships a license skeleton (`LicenseValidator`, `LicenseGate`, admin endpoint) but
nothing enforces anything. Open mode (no license configured) currently grants *all* features and
*no* limits — the opposite of what we want for a self-hosted distribution that needs to gate scale
behind a paid license.

We want:

1. A self-hosted server with **no license** to operate within a small, hard-coded "default tier"
   that is enough to evaluate the product but not enough to run it in production.
2. Licenses to express **arbitrary per-customer limits** (no fixed tiers) on a vendor-defined set
   of resources: entity counts, compute footprint, retention.
3. A **standalone minter** owned by the vendor that signs licenses with an Ed25519 private key the
   customer never sees.
4. Licenses to be **persisted** on the server, **installable** via env var, file, or admin POST,
   and **renewable** by replacement.
5. **Revocation** handled out of band (vendor suspends the SaaS tenant, or issues short-`exp`
   licenses) — no online revocation callback in v1.

## Non-goals

- Feature flags. The current `Feature` enum (topology/lineage/correlation/debugger/replay) is dead
  scaffolding and gets removed; this design is about quantitative limits only.
- Ingestion-rate limits (executions/minute, logs/minute). Defer to a follow-up.
- Online revocation. Vendor uses shorter `exp` + reissue; SaaS suspension is independent.
- Auto-deletion of resources when caps are lowered. Existing rows stay; only new creates reject.
- Minter keypair generation tooling. Vendor uses standard `openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519`
  out of band.

---

## 1. Architecture

### 1.1 Module layout

```
cameleer-server-core/                    (existing — pure domain, no Spring)
└── license/
    ├── LicenseInfo                      (record — see §2)
    ├── LicenseLimits                    (typed wrapper over the limits map)
    ├── LicenseValidator                 (existing, payload schema updated)
    ├── LicenseGate                      (existing, gutted: no Feature; getLimits() only)
    ├── LicenseStateMachine              (NEW — pure FSM: ABSENT / ACTIVE / GRACE / EXPIRED / INVALID)
    └── DefaultTierLimits                (constant — §3.2 numbers)

cameleer-server-app/                     (existing — Spring, web, persistence)
├── license/
│   ├── LicenseRepository                (NEW — PostgreSQL persistence)
│   ├── LicenseService                   (NEW — load/save/replace; publishes LicenseChangedEvent)
│   ├── LicenseEnforcer                  (NEW — assertWithinCap entry point)
│   ├── LicenseUsageReader               (NEW — counts current usage for /usage endpoint)
│   ├── LicenseCapExceededException      (NEW — mapped to 403 by ControllerAdvice)
│   ├── LicenseRevalidationJob           (NEW — @Scheduled daily; updates last_validated_at)
│   ├── RetentionPolicyApplier           (NEW — @EventListener(LicenseChangedEvent); recomputes ClickHouse TTL + per-env caps)
│   └── LicenseMetrics                   (NEW — Prometheus gauges)
├── controller/
│   ├── LicenseAdminController           (existing — extended; persists, audited)
│   └── LicenseUsageController           (NEW — GET /admin/license/usage)
└── config/
    └── LicenseBeanConfig                (existing — extended for DB load order)

cameleer-license-minter/                 (NEW — top-level Maven module)
├── pom.xml                              (depends on cameleer-server-core)
├── LicenseMinter                        (signing primitive; takes private key + LicenseInfo)
└── cli/LicenseMinterCli                 (CLI main class, supports --verify)
```

### 1.2 Why a separate `cameleer-license-minter` module

Not shipped in the runtime JAR. Vendor distributes it independently or builds it from source on a
trusted machine. Customers never receive it.

This is module hygiene + smaller runtime attack surface, not a cryptographic protection — license
forgery requires the vendor's private key, and the public key in the server is enough to verify
forged tokens regardless of where the minter code lives.

### 1.3 Dependency graph

```
cameleer-license-minter ──▶ cameleer-server-core (LicenseInfo schema only)
cameleer-server-app     ──▶ cameleer-server-core (validator, gate, FSM, defaults)
cameleer-saas           ──▶ cameleer-license-minter (for SaaS-mode minting)
cameleer-saas           ──▶ cameleer-server-core   (transitive)
```

`cameleer-server-app` has **no** dependency on `cameleer-license-minter`.

---

## 2. License envelope

Wire format unchanged: `base64(payload).base64(ed25519_signature)`. Payload schema:

```json
{
  "licenseId": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
  "tenantId": "acme-corp",
  "label": "ACME prod 2026 — site:hamburg",
  "iat": 1745539200,
  "exp": 1777075200,
  "gracePeriodDays": 30,
  "limits": {
    "max_environments": 5,
    "max_apps": 50,
    "max_agents": 100,
    "max_users": 25,
    "max_outbound_connections": 10,
    "max_alert_rules": 200,
    "max_total_cpu_millis": 32000,
    "max_total_memory_mb": 65536,
    "max_total_replicas": 100,
    "max_execution_retention_days": 90,
    "max_log_retention_days": 30,
    "max_metric_retention_days": 365,
    "max_jar_retention_count": 10
  }
}
```

### 2.1 Field rules

| Field | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `licenseId` | yes | UUID. Used in audit + future revocation. |
| `tenantId` | **yes** | Must match `CAMELEER_SERVER_TENANT_ID`. Mismatch = `INVALID` state (see §3). The field is inside the signed payload, so a self-hosted customer cannot strip it to make a license portable across tenants — any edit invalidates the signature. Air-gapped customers receive a license bound to a vendor-issued tenant id (not necessarily a UUID — any non-empty slug). |
| `label` | optional | Free-form human description. Surfaced in UI. |
| `iat` | yes | Unix seconds. |
| `exp` | yes | Unix seconds. |
| `gracePeriodDays` | optional, default `0` | Days `exp` may be in the past while limits still apply. |
| `limits.*` | each optional | Missing key inherits from `DefaultTierLimits`. A license can lift any subset. |

### 2.2 Removed from the current envelope

- `tier` (string) — was a non-functional label. Folded into `label`.
- `features` (array) — out of scope. `Feature` enum deleted.

---

## 3. License state machine

```
                                                      exp + grace passes
       ┌─────────┐  install valid  ┌────────┐  exp  ┌────────┐ ────────► ┌─────────┐
       │ ABSENT  │ ───────────────▶│ ACTIVE │──────▶│ GRACE  │           │ EXPIRED │
       └─────────┘                  └────────┘       └────────┘           └─────────┘
            ▲                            │              │ ▲                   │
            │                            │ replace      │ │ replace valid     │ replace
            │                            ▼              │ │                   ▼
            │  ┌─────────┐               └──────────────┴─┴───────────────────┘
            └──┤ INVALID │ ──── replace valid ────────────────────────────────▶ ACTIVE
               └─────────┘
                   ▲
                   │ install fails (signature / tenant / parse / public-key-missing)
                                              all transitions persist + audit-log
```

### 3.1 State semantics

| State     | Effective limits                  | Trigger                                                           | Severity |
|---        |---                                |---                                                                |---       |
| `ABSENT`  | `DefaultTierLimits`               | No DB row. Clean install with no license configured.              | INFO     |
| `ACTIVE`  | `merge(default, license.limits)`  | License loaded, `now < exp`.                                      | INFO     |
| `GRACE`   | Same as `ACTIVE`                  | `exp ≤ now < exp + gracePeriodDays`. UI warning banner.           | WARN     |
| `EXPIRED` | `DefaultTierLimits`               | `now ≥ exp + gracePeriodDays`. UI label distinct from ABSENT.     | ERROR    |
| `INVALID` | `DefaultTierLimits`               | Signature failure, tenant mismatch, parse error, or public key not configured but a token is present. | **ERROR — loud** |

`ABSENT` and `INVALID` produce the same enforcement (default tier) but are surfaced very
differently:

- **`ABSENT`** is a clean state — fresh install, no license yet. UI shows a calm "Install a
  license to lift the default-tier caps" call to action. No audit row beyond the boot log line.
- **`INVALID`** is an active error — tampering, wrong public key, or a paste that lost
  characters. UI shows a red banner with the validator's error message
  (e.g. "License signature verification failed", "License tenantId 'acme-corp' does not match
  server tenant 'beta-corp'"). Audit row written under
  `AuditCategory.LICENSE` action `reject_license`. Prometheus
  `cameleer_license_state{state="INVALID"} = 1` so an alert can fire.

State is recomputed on every limit check (clock comparison only against parsed in-memory
`LicenseInfo`) — no scheduler needed for `ACTIVE → GRACE → EXPIRED` transitions. A separate
**daily revalidation job** (§6.6) re-runs the signature check against the DB row to catch slow
failures like public-key rotation drift.

### 3.2 Default tier (the "no license" caps)

| Limit | Default |
|---|---|
| `max_environments`              | 1   |
| `max_apps`                      | 3   |
| `max_agents`                    | 5   |
| `max_users`                     | 3   |
| `max_outbound_connections`      | 1   |
| `max_alert_rules`               | 2   |
| `max_total_cpu_millis`          | 2000 (2 cores) |
| `max_total_memory_mb`           | 2048 (2 GB)    |
| `max_total_replicas`            | 5   |
| `max_execution_retention_days`  | 1   |
| `max_log_retention_days`        | 1   |
| `max_metric_retention_days`     | 1   |
| `max_jar_retention_count`       | 3   |

Encoded as `public static final Map<String, Integer> DEFAULTS` in `DefaultTierLimits`. Keys
match the license payload exactly.

---

## 4. Enforcement map

Every limit check goes through one method on `LicenseEnforcer`:

```java
void assertWithinCap(String limitKey, long currentUsage, long requestedDelta);
```

Throws `LicenseCapExceededException(limitKey, current, cap)` when `currentUsage + requestedDelta > cap`.
A `@ControllerAdvice` maps it to `403` with a body that explains the "why" so operators can act
without grepping logs:

```json
{
  "error": "license cap reached",
  "limit": "max_apps",
  "current": 3,
  "cap": 3,
  "state": "EXPIRED",
  "message": "License expired 5 days ago: system reverted to default tier (3 apps). Current usage is 3. Install or renew the license to create more apps."
}
```

The `message` field is rendered server-side from a small template per state:

| State    | Message template |
|---       |---|
| `ABSENT` | "No license installed: default tier applies (cap = N for {limit}). Install a license to raise this." |
| `ACTIVE` | "License cap reached: {limit} = {cap}. Current usage is {current}. Contact your vendor to raise the cap." |
| `GRACE`  | "License expired {n} day(s) ago and is in its grace period (ends in {m} days). Cap unchanged at {cap}. Renew before grace ends." |
| `EXPIRED`| "License expired {n} days ago: system reverted to default tier (cap = N for {limit}). Current usage is {current}. Renew the license to lift the cap." |
| `INVALID`| "License rejected ({reason}): default tier applies (cap = N for {limit}). Fix the license to raise this." |

### 4.1 Per-limit call sites

| Limit | Call site | Failure response |
|---|---|---|
| `max_environments`             | `EnvironmentService.create` (start)                                       | 403 |
| `max_apps`                     | `AppService.createApp`                                                    | 403 |
| `max_agents`                   | `AgentRegistryService.register`                                           | 403 — agent treated as unregistered (no SSE, no commands) |
| `max_users`                    | `UserAdminController.createUser` and `OidcAuthController.callback` (auto-signup) | 403 / OIDC login failure |
| `max_outbound_connections`     | `OutboundConnectionServiceImpl.create`                                    | 403 |
| `max_alert_rules`              | `AlertRuleController.create`                                              | 403 |
| `max_total_cpu_millis`         | `DeploymentExecutor.PRE_FLIGHT` (sum across non-stopped deploys + new)    | Deploy fails fast at PRE_FLIGHT, status FAILED, audit row |
| `max_total_memory_mb`          | same                                                                       | same |
| `max_total_replicas`           | same                                                                       | same |
| `max_execution_retention_days` | `EnvironmentService.update` (per-env field, see §4.2) + `RetentionPolicyApplier` (see §4.3) | 422 on update; ClickHouse TTL recomputed on every license change |
| `max_log_retention_days`       | same                                                                       | same |
| `max_metric_retention_days`    | same                                                                       | same |
| `max_jar_retention_count`      | `EnvironmentAdminController.PUT /jar-retention`                            | 422 |

### 4.2 Per-environment retention fields

Three new columns on `environments` (Flyway V2):

```sql
ALTER TABLE environments
  ADD COLUMN execution_retention_days INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
  ADD COLUMN log_retention_days       INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
  ADD COLUMN metric_retention_days    INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1;
```

These are the configured per-env values. The effective ClickHouse TTL is
`min(licenseCap, configured)`. Admin UI surfaces the configured values;
`EnvironmentService.update` rejects values above the license cap with 422.

### 4.3 Runtime retention recompute

`RetentionPolicyApplier` is `@EventListener(LicenseChangedEvent)`:

- Triggered on every `LicenseService.replace(...)` (boot install, env-var override, file
  override, POST `/admin/license`) **and** on every state transition the revalidation job
  detects (e.g. license becomes `EXPIRED`, caps drop to default).
- Recomputes the effective TTL per env (`min(licenseCap, configured)`), then issues
  `ALTER TABLE … MODIFY TTL …` on the affected ClickHouse tables (executions, processors,
  logs, metrics, route_diagrams, agent_events). One ALTER per table per affected env.
- Errors are logged WARN; a failed ALTER does not block the license install — the operator can
  retry by reposting the license. The previous TTL keeps applying until the next successful
  ALTER.
- At boot, `LicenseService.loadInitial(...)` publishes one `LicenseChangedEvent` after the
  load order in §6.2 settles, so the boot path goes through the same applier as runtime
  changes.

Result: a server that stays up for months and lands in `EXPIRED` will see ClickHouse TTLs
collapse to default-tier values automatically — no restart needed.

### 4.4 Boot-time invariant

If a license is added that *lowers* a cap below current usage (10 apps, license now allows 5), the
server logs one WARN per limit at boot. **No deletion**. New creates reject; existing resources
keep working.

---

## 5. Usage endpoint

`GET /api/v1/admin/license/usage` (ADMIN only):

```json
{
  "state": "ACTIVE",
  "expiresAt": "2027-04-25T00:00:00Z",
  "daysRemaining": 365,
  "gracePeriodDays": 30,
  "tenantId": "acme-corp",
  "label": "ACME prod 2026",
  "lastValidatedAt": "2026-04-26T03:14:07Z",
  "message": "License active. 365 days remaining.",
  "limits": [
    {"key": "max_apps", "current": 7, "cap": 50, "source": "license"},
    {"key": "max_agents", "current": 12, "cap": 100, "source": "license"},
    {"key": "max_total_cpu_millis", "current": 8500, "cap": 32000, "source": "license"},
    {"key": "max_outbound_connections", "current": 0, "cap": 1, "source": "default"}
  ]
}
```

`source` is `"default"` when the cap comes from `DefaultTierLimits` (i.e. the license omits this
key, or there is no license), and `"license"` when the cap is explicit in the license. Drives the
SaaS UI's "free tier" badge.

`message` carries the same human-readable explanation that the 403 body uses, varying by state:

- `ABSENT` — "No license installed. Default tier applies."
- `ACTIVE` — "License active. {n} days remaining."
- `GRACE`  — "License expired {n} days ago. Grace period ends in {m} days. Renew now to avoid degradation."
- `EXPIRED`— "License expired {n} days ago. System reverted to default tier."
- `INVALID`— "License rejected: {reason}. Default tier applies. Fix the license to recover."

`LicenseUsageReader` issues one cheap aggregate per limit (`SELECT COUNT(*)` per entity table; a
single grouped `SELECT SUM(replicas * cpuMillis), SUM(replicas * memoryMb), SUM(replicas)` over
non-stopped deployments).

`GET /api/v1/admin/license` (existing) is extended to return `{state, envelope, lastValidatedAt}`
with the raw token omitted from the response.

---

## 6. Lifecycle, persistence, install paths

### 6.1 Storage

Flyway V2 migration:

```sql
CREATE TABLE license (
  tenant_id         TEXT PRIMARY KEY,        -- one row per server (= one tenant)
  token             TEXT NOT NULL,           -- full signed token
  license_id        UUID NOT NULL,
  installed_at      TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
  installed_by      TEXT NOT NULL,           -- users.user_id (bare) or 'system' for env/file boot
  expires_at        TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
  last_validated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL     -- updated by boot, install, and revalidation job
);
```

`last_validated_at` is the timestamp of the most recent **successful** signature/parse round-trip
against the current public key. Useful for troubleshooting "why did my license stop working" — a
stale `last_validated_at` next to a recent `now` is a strong signal that revalidation is failing
and the operator should check the public key.

### 6.2 Boot order

`LicenseBeanConfig`:

1. If `CAMELEER_SERVER_LICENSE_TOKEN` env var is set → validate → write to DB (overwrite,
   sets `last_validated_at = now`) → load.
2. Else if `CAMELEER_SERVER_LICENSE_FILE` is set → read file → validate → write to DB → load.
3. Else read `license` row from DB → validate → on success update `last_validated_at = now` →
   load.
4. Else `ABSENT`.

After step 1–3 the service publishes one `LicenseChangedEvent` so the retention applier and
metrics gauges initialise off the same code path as runtime changes.

Env-var / file act as **idempotent overrides** — they always win and replace the DB row, so the
operator's last action survives reboots.

### 6.3 Runtime install

`POST /api/v1/admin/license { "token": "..." }` (existing):
- Validates against the configured public key.
- On success, persists to `license` table (`installed_by = user_id`, `last_validated_at = now`),
  updates the in-memory `LicenseGate`, publishes `LicenseChangedEvent`, audits.
- On failure, returns 400 with the validator error message and audits the rejection.
  Server transitions to `INVALID` state if a previously-loaded license was replaced; otherwise
  remains in its prior state (the rejected token is *not* written to DB).

### 6.4 Public key custody

`CAMELEER_SERVER_LICENSE_PUBLICKEY` (existing) remains the only verification key. Build- /
deploy-time secret bound to the vendor distribution. **Not stored in DB.** If unset *and* a
license is present → reject all licenses (existing behaviour) → `INVALID` state.

### 6.5 Audit trail

New `AuditCategory.LICENSE`. Actions:

| Action | When | Payload |
|---|---|---|
| `install_license` | First successful install in an empty state | `{licenseId, expiresAt, installedBy, source}` (`source` = `env`/`file`/`api`) |
| `replace_license` | Successful install over an existing license | same + `previousLicenseId` |
| `reject_license`  | Validation failed (signature, tenant, parse, public key missing) | `{reason, source}` |
| `revalidate_license` | Daily job result, on **failure only** | `{licenseId, reason}` |
| `cap_exceeded`    | Any `LicenseCapExceededException` | `{limit, current, cap, requestedBy, state}` |

### 6.6 Daily revalidation job

`LicenseRevalidationJob`:
- `@Scheduled(cron = "0 0 3 * * *")` (03:00 server local time) plus an immediate run 60s
  after boot.
- Reads the DB token, re-runs `LicenseValidator.validate(token)` against the current public
  key.
- On success: `UPDATE license SET last_validated_at = now WHERE tenant_id = ?`.
- On failure (e.g. operator rotated the public key without reinstalling the license, or DB
  row was tampered with directly): transition state to `INVALID`, publish
  `LicenseChangedEvent` (so retention recomputes too), audit `revalidate_license` with the
  reason, log `ERROR`.
- Cheap (no I/O beyond one DB read + one DB write); safe to run frequently. 03:00 is chosen
  to coincide with off-peak so the WARN noise lands when humans aren't deploying.

---

## 7. Minter

### 7.1 `LicenseMinter` (library)

Pure function, packaged in `cameleer-license-minter`:

```java
public final class LicenseMinter {
    public static String mint(LicenseInfo info, PrivateKey ed25519PrivateKey);
}
```

Serializes `LicenseInfo` to canonical JSON (sorted keys), signs the bytes with Ed25519, returns
`base64(payload).base64(signature)`. cameleer-saas calls this directly to mint per-tenant tokens.

### 7.2 `LicenseMinterCli` (CLI)

```bash
java -jar cameleer-license-minter-1.0-SNAPSHOT.jar \
     --private-key=/secure/vendor.key \
     --public-key=/secure/vendor.pub \
     --tenant=acme-corp \
     --label="ACME prod 2026" \
     --expires=2027-04-25 \
     --grace-days=30 \
     --max-apps=50 \
     --max-agents=100 \
     --max-total-cpu-millis=32000 \
     --max-total-memory-mb=65536 \
     --max-execution-retention-days=90 \
     --output=acme-license.tok \
     --verify
```

- `--private-key` reads a PEM-encoded Ed25519 private key (output of
  `openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519`).
- `--public-key` *(used only with `--verify`)* reads the matching public key. Required when
  `--verify` is set; ignored otherwise.
- Unspecified `--max-*` flags are omitted from the payload — the license inherits the default for
  that key.
- Unknown flags fail fast.
- `--output` writes the token; if omitted, prints to stdout.
- `--verify` round-trips the freshly-minted token through `LicenseValidator` against
  `--public-key` *after* writing the output file. This catches:
  - corruption between `String → file` write,
  - wrong-key pairing (vendor accidentally pointed `--public-key` at a different keypair's
    public half),
  - signature mismatch from a buggy build of the minter.
  On verify failure the CLI exits non-zero, prints the validator error, and (if `--output` was
  written) deletes the output file so the bad token does not get shipped.

Keypair generation is **out of band** — vendor uses `openssl` and stores both halves in their
secret manager. We deliberately do not ship a `--gen-keypair` subcommand to keep the boundary
clean.

---

## 8. Telemetry

Prometheus gauges scraped via `/api/v1/prometheus`:

| Metric | Labels | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `cameleer_license_state`            | `state="ABSENT|ACTIVE|GRACE|EXPIRED|INVALID"` | Boolean — exactly one is 1. |
| `cameleer_license_days_remaining`   | (none)                                | Negative in GRACE/EXPIRED. |
| `cameleer_license_limit_utilisation`| `limit="max_apps"` etc.               | `current / cap`, in `[0, 1+]`. |
| `cameleer_license_cap_rejections_total` | `limit="..."`                     | Counter. |
| `cameleer_license_last_validated_age_seconds` | (none)                      | `now - last_validated_at`. Spikes if the daily revalidation job is failing. |

State-transition log lines: `INFO` on install/ACTIVE, `WARN` on GRACE, `ERROR` on EXPIRED,
`ERROR` on INVALID, `WARN` on cap reject (sampled to avoid log spam).

Recommended alert (in cameleer-saas Grafana, not shipped with the server): page on
`cameleer_license_state{state="INVALID"} == 1` for > 5 minutes.

---

## 9. Dead-code removal

Performed in the **first commit** of the implementation. Per the project's "no backwards
compatibility shims" preference, no deprecated path or feature flag.

- Delete `Feature.java`.
- Delete `LicenseGate.isEnabled(Feature)`.
- Delete `LicenseInfo.features` field, `LicenseInfo.hasFeature(Feature)`.
- Delete `LicenseGateTest.withLicense_onlyLicensedFeaturesEnabled` and `LicenseInfo.open()`'s
  `Set.of(Feature.values())` assertion.
- Update `LicenseValidator` to ignore `features` if present in old tokens (silently dropped,
  not an error).

---

## 10. Testing

| Layer | Tests |
|---|---|
| Core unit | `LicenseValidatorTest` — signature, expiry, tenant mismatch, missing required fields (`tenantId`, `licenseId`, `iat`, `exp`), unknown extra fields. |
| Core unit | `LicenseStateMachineTest` — all five transitions including grace boundary, replace from any state, invalid install routes to `INVALID`, valid install from `INVALID` recovers to `ACTIVE`. |
| Core unit | `DefaultTierLimitsTest` — every documented key has a default. |
| Minter unit | `LicenseMinterTest` — round-trip with a throwaway Ed25519 keypair. Canonical JSON is stable across runs. |
| Minter CLI | `LicenseMinterCliTest` — invokes `main` with `--private-key=tmp` and checks output token validates; `--verify` happy path; `--verify` failure path deletes the output file and exits non-zero. |
| App unit | `LicenseEnforcerTest` — for each limit: cap-reached, under-cap, default-tier with no license, missing-cap-inherits-default, message text varies per state. |
| App unit | `RetentionPolicyApplierTest` — license-changed event recomputes effective TTL per env; failed ALTER logs WARN and does not throw. |
| App integration | `LicenseLifecycleIT` — install via env, replace via POST, restart restores from DB, public-key removal at runtime transitions to `INVALID`, daily revalidation job updates `last_validated_at`. Driven through REST. |
| App integration | `LicenseEnforcementIT` — REST-driven, hit each cap end-to-end (per the project's "REST-API-driven ITs" preference). Includes `cap_exceeded` audit row check and verifies the 403 body's `message` field matches the state. |
| App integration | `RetentionRuntimeRecomputeIT` — install license with `max_log_retention_days=30`, observe `logs` TTL ALTER fires; replace with `max_log_retention_days=7`, observe TTL drops to 7 without restart. |
| Boot | `SchemaBootstrapIT` extension — `license` table exists with `last_validated_at`, `environments` retention columns exist, retention pinning honoured at boot. |

No raw-SQL seeding of caps in ITs. All caps installed via the REST endpoint or env var.

---

## 11. Open follow-ups (deliberately deferred)

- Ingestion-rate limits (`max_executions_per_minute`, `max_logs_per_minute`).
- Online revocation callback (the `revocation_check_url` envelope field).
- Concurrent debug session limit (`max_concurrent_debug_sessions` from the SaaS epic).
- A "license usage history" report for vendors to see growth over time.
- Open a tracking issue on `cameleer/cameleer-server` (Gitea) — none exists today.

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## 12. Risk register

| Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Default tier so tight that an honest evaluator cannot try the product. | Defaults documented; vendor can ship a longer-`exp` "trial" license at install time if needed. |
| Customer lowers `gracePeriodDays` field by editing token. | Token is signed; any edit invalidates the signature. |
| License removed from DB out of band, server lands in ABSENT and rejects new resources but old ones are above default tier. | Boot-time WARN per over-cap limit. UI banner in the admin license page. No auto-deletion. |
| Public key rotation. | Out of scope for v1; documented as "redeploy with new key" — vendors are expected to rotate via redeployment. Daily revalidation job catches a rotation that wasn't paired with a reinstall (state → `INVALID`, alertable). |
| Compute cap arithmetic relies on `cpuLimit` and `memoryLimitMb` being set on every container. | Existing `ResolvedContainerConfig` already enforces these; `DeploymentExecutor.PRE_FLIGHT` rejects deploys with unset compute fields. |
| Per-env retention column added but old ClickHouse partitions retain longer. | Documented: TTL change is honoured by ClickHouse on its next merge cycle. New rows inserted always honour the new TTL. |
| `RetentionPolicyApplier` issues blocking ALTERs from the event listener thread. | Applier runs ALTERs serialised but on a separate executor (not the publisher thread) so a slow ClickHouse does not stall the install API call. License install API returns immediately with the new state; retention recompute completes asynchronously and is observable via metrics. |