Action required by the cameleer-saas / Logto admin team before the cameleer-server logout fix is fully effective in customer environments.
## What changed in cameleer-server
The SPA now performs a proper OIDC RP-Initiated Logout: a top-level navigation to the IdP's `end_session_endpoint` with `id_token_hint`, `post_logout_redirect_uri`, and `client_id`. After Logto clears its session cookie it 302-redirects back to `post_logout_redirect_uri`.
Previously the SPA fired a cross-origin `fetch(... {mode:'no-cors'})` which is a no-op for OIDC — Logto's session cookie only clears under a top-level browsing context. Result: the next SSO click silently re-authenticated the prior user.
In addition, cameleer-server now exposes `POST /api/v1/auth/logout` which bumps `users.token_revoked_before = now().plusMillis(1)` for the calling user, invalidating every outstanding refresh + access token server-side. This protects against leaked-token scenarios that don't involve the IdP at all (XSS, copied bearer token, etc.). The `+1ms` guards against a same-millisecond race where a token issued in the exact ms of logout would otherwise survive the strict `isBefore` revocation check.
3. Set `sessionStorage['cameleer:signed_out'] = '1'` so the post-logout `/login` render shows a "You have been signed out successfully" splash instead of any auto-flow.
4.`window.location.replace(end_session_endpoint?id_token_hint=…&post_logout_redirect_uri=…&client_id=…)` for OIDC users (top-level navigation), or `/login` for local users.
`prompt=login` is also added to the OIDC authorization redirect on the way back in, as defence-in-depth: even if the IdP session cookie somehow survives logout, the IdP will re-prompt for credentials rather than silently re-authenticating.
## What the SaaS team must do
For **each cameleer-server tenant** registered as a Logto application, add the post-logout redirect URL to the application's allowed list:
```
Logto admin console
→ Applications → <cameleer-server tenant client>
→ Redirect URIs / Post sign-out redirect URIs
→ add: https://<tenant-base-url>/login
```
Example values (replace `<tenant-base-url>` with the customer's actual deployment URL):
If the SPA is served under a non-root base path (`config.basePath` in `ui/src/config.ts`), include the base path in the URL — e.g. `https://host/cameleer/login`. Logto matches strictly; trailing-slash and scheme mismatches fail the redirect.
## How to verify
After adding the URI:
1. Sign in to cameleer-server via SSO.
2. Sign out from the user menu.
3. Confirm the browser navigates through Logto's `end_session_endpoint` and lands on `/login` showing **"You have been signed out successfully."**
4. Click "Sign in again" → "Sign in with Single Sign-On" — Logto **must** show its login screen, **not** silently re-authenticate.
5. Sign in as a different user; confirm the dashboard reflects the new identity.
If silent re-auth still happens after step 4, the most likely cause is that `prompt=login` is being stripped by an intermediary or the IdP doesn't honor it for the configured client. The SPA already sets `prompt=login` defensively; verify by inspecting the redirect URL in DevTools → Network.
## Failure modes
| Symptom | Likely cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Browser lands on Logto error "invalid post_logout_redirect_uri" | URI not registered, or trailing-slash / scheme mismatch | Add exact URL in Logto admin (Logto matches strictly) |
| User signs out, re-clicks SSO, lands back authenticated as same user | IdP session cookie not cleared — usually the end_session redirect failed to a Logto error page instead of the SPA's `/login` | Check Logto application → Audit logs for the failed `end_session` call; usually traces back to redirect URI registration |
| 204 from `/api/v1/auth/logout` but the SPA still appears authenticated locally | SPA bug — file an issue (server side is verified by `LogoutControllerIT` and `JwtRevocationIT`) | n/a |
| SPA splash never appears after logout | `sessionStorage['cameleer:signed_out']` not set, or `LoginPage` renders before `useState` initializer reads it — check `auth-store.logout` is being called before the navigation | Inspect `ui/src/auth/auth-store.ts:logout` |
| Stolen token still works after victim logged out | `JwtAuthenticationFilter` revocation lookup is broken (the original bug, fixed in `7066795c`) | Confirm filter at `JwtAuthenticationFilter:91` strips `user:` before `findById`. `JwtRevocationIT` is the regression. |
| `ui/ npm run build` | ✅ built in 1.21s (pre-existing chunk-size warning unchanged, unrelated) |
The pre-existing revocation-bug regression (token still works after logout) is now covered by `JwtRevocationIT.revokedTokenIsRejectedOnAuthenticatedRequest` and the end-to-end logout flow by `LogoutControllerIT.logoutRevokesTokensAuditsAndRejectsSubsequentCalls`. Both depend on the `JwtAuthenticationFilter` prefix-strip fix in commit `7066795c`.
### Manual — required from the SaaS team
- [ ] Register `https://<tenant-base-url>/login` as a `post_logout_redirect_uri` on the Logto application for each cameleer-server tenant (per the table above).
- [ ] Local-user smoke (in a browser): sign in → sign out → confirm 204 from `/api/v1/auth/logout` in DevTools Network tab → confirm "Signed out successfully" splash → "Sign in again" → confirm local form re-renders cleanly.
- [ ] OIDC-user smoke (in a browser, against Logto): sign in via SSO as user A → sign out → confirm top-level navigation through Logto's `end_session_endpoint` → land on splash → "Sign in again" → "Sign in with SSO" → confirm Logto **shows its login screen** (not silent re-auth) → sign in as user B → confirm dashboard reflects B (not A).
The automated coverage proves the server-side revocation works. The manual checks prove the IdP-side session is also cleared and the UX flow is correct end-to-end.
