docs(alerting): update app-classes.md for Phase 9 REST controllers (Task 36)

- Add AlertRuleController, AlertController, AlertSilenceController, AlertNotificationController entries
- Document inbox SQL visibility contract (target_user_ids/group_ids/role_names — no broadcast)
- Add /api/v1/alerts/notifications/{id}/retry to flat-endpoint allow-list
- Update SecurityConfig entry with alerting path matchers
- Note attribute-key SQL injection validation contract on AlertRuleController

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.claude/rules/app-classes.md

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ These paths intentionally stay flat (no `/environments/{envSlug}` prefix). Every
 | `/api/v1/catalog`, `/api/v1/catalog/{applicationId}` | Cross-env discovery is the purpose. Env is an optional filter via `?environment=`. |
 | `/api/v1/executions/{execId}`, `/processors/**` | Exchange IDs are globally unique; permalinks. |
 | `/api/v1/diagrams/{contentHash}/render`, `POST /api/v1/diagrams/render` | Content-addressed or stateless. |
+| `/api/v1/alerts/notifications/{id}/retry` | Notification IDs are globally unique; no env routing needed. |
 | `/api/v1/auth/**` | Pre-auth; no env context exists. |
 | `/api/v1/health`, `/prometheus`, `/api-docs/**`, `/swagger-ui/**` | Server metadata. |
 
@@ -50,6 +51,10 @@ ClickHouse is shared across tenants. Every ClickHouse query must filter by `tena
 - `AgentEventsController` — GET `/api/v1/environments/{envSlug}/agents/events` (lifecycle events; cursor-paginated, returns `{ data, nextCursor, hasMore }`; order `(timestamp DESC, insert_id DESC)`; cursor is base64url of `"{timestampIso}|{insert_id_uuid}"` — `insert_id` is a stable UUID column used as a same-millisecond tiebreak).
 - `AgentMetricsController` — GET `/api/v1/environments/{envSlug}/agents/{agentId}/metrics` (JVM/Camel metrics). Rejects cross-env agents (404) as defence-in-depth.
 - `DiagramRenderController` — GET `/api/v1/environments/{envSlug}/apps/{appSlug}/routes/{routeId}/diagram` (env-scoped lookup). Also GET `/api/v1/diagrams/{contentHash}/render` (flat — content hashes are globally unique).
+- `AlertRuleController` — `/api/v1/environments/{envSlug}/alerts/rules`. GET list / POST create / GET `{id}` / PUT `{id}` / DELETE `{id}` / POST `{id}/enable` / POST `{id}/disable` / POST `{id}/render-preview` / POST `{id}/test-evaluate`. OPERATOR+ for mutations, VIEWER+ for reads. CRITICAL: attribute keys in `ExchangeMatchCondition.filter.attributes` are validated at rule-save time against `^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$` — they are later inlined into ClickHouse SQL. Webhook validation: verifies `outboundConnectionId` exists and `isAllowedInEnvironment`. Null notification templates default to `""` (NOT NULL constraint). Audit: `ALERT_RULE_CHANGE`.
+- `AlertController` — `/api/v1/environments/{envSlug}/alerts`. GET list (inbox filtered by userId/groupIds/roleNames via `InAppInboxQuery`) / GET `/unread-count` / GET `{id}` / POST `{id}/ack` / POST `{id}/read` / POST `/bulk-read`. VIEWER+ for all. Inbox SQL: `? = ANY(target_user_ids) OR target_group_ids && ? OR target_role_names && ?` — requires at least one matching target (no broadcast concept).
+- `AlertSilenceController` — `/api/v1/environments/{envSlug}/alerts/silences`. GET list / POST create / DELETE `{id}`. 422 if `endsAt <= startsAt`. OPERATOR+ for mutations, VIEWER+ for list. Audit: `ALERT_SILENCE_CHANGE`.
+- `AlertNotificationController` — Dual-path (no class-level prefix). GET `/api/v1/environments/{envSlug}/alerts/{alertId}/notifications` (VIEWER+); POST `/api/v1/alerts/notifications/{id}/retry` (OPERATOR+, flat — notification IDs globally unique). Retry resets attempts to 0 and sets `nextAttemptAt = now`.
 
 ### Env admin (env-slug-parameterized, not env-scoped data)
 
@@ -135,7 +140,7 @@ ClickHouse is shared across tenants. Every ClickHouse query must filter by `tena
 
 ## security/ — Spring Security
 
-- `SecurityConfig` — WebSecurityFilterChain, JWT filter, CORS, OIDC conditional. `/api/v1/admin/outbound-connections/**` GETs permit OPERATOR in addition to ADMIN (defense-in-depth at controller level); mutations remain ADMIN-only.
+- `SecurityConfig` — WebSecurityFilterChain, JWT filter, CORS, OIDC conditional. `/api/v1/admin/outbound-connections/**` GETs permit OPERATOR in addition to ADMIN (defense-in-depth at controller level); mutations remain ADMIN-only. Alerting matchers: GET `/environments/*/alerts/**` VIEWER+; POST/PUT/DELETE rules and silences OPERATOR+; ack/read/bulk-read VIEWER+; POST `/alerts/notifications/*/retry` OPERATOR+.
 - `JwtAuthenticationFilter` — OncePerRequestFilter, validates Bearer tokens
 - `JwtServiceImpl` — HMAC-SHA256 JWT (Nimbus JOSE)
 - `OidcAuthController` — /api/v1/auth/oidc (login-uri, token-exchange, logout)