Merge feature/logout-hardening: server-side revocation + RP-Initiated Logout

Fixes a silent token-revocation bug (JwtAuthenticationFilter was looking
up users by prefixed JWT subject instead of the bare user_id), adds
POST /api/v1/auth/logout that bumps token_revoked_before, and replaces
the broken cross-origin fetch logout in the SPA with a proper top-level
RP-Initiated Logout redirect (id_token_hint + post_logout_redirect_uri
+ client_id). Adds a signed-out splash and prompt=login defence.

Operational follow-up: SaaS team must register
<base-url>/login as a post_logout_redirect_uri on each Logto tenant
client. See docs/handoff/2026-04-27-logout-hardening.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.claude/rules/app-classes.md

@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ Env-scoped read-path controllers (`AlertController`, `AlertRuleController`, `Ale
 
 ### Auth (flat)
 
-- `UiAuthController` — `/api/v1/auth` (login, refresh, me). Local username/password against env-var admin or DB BCrypt hash. Lockout after 5 failed attempts.
+- `UiAuthController` — `/api/v1/auth` (login, refresh, me, logout). Local username/password against env-var admin or DB BCrypt hash. Lockout after 5 failed attempts. `POST /logout` is permitAll — controller resolves the user from the access token if present, bumps `users.token_revoked_before = now().plusMillis(1)` to invalidate all outstanding refresh + access tokens (enforced by `JwtAuthenticationFilter`), audits `AuditCategory.AUTH / logout`, returns 204. Best-effort: 204 also when called without a token so the SPA's logout never fails on already-expired sessions. The +1ms guards against same-millisecond races (JWT `iat` is ms-quantised, filter check is strict `isBefore`).
 - `OidcAuthController` — `/api/v1/auth/oidc` (config, callback). Code → token exchange. Roles via custom JWT claim, claim mapping rules, or default roles.
 - `AuthCapabilitiesController` — `GET /api/v1/auth/capabilities` (unauthenticated). Reports `{oidc:{enabled, providerName, primary}, localAccounts:{enabled, adminRecoveryOnly}}` so the SPA renders the login page deterministically. `oidc.primary == oidc.enabled`; `localAccounts.adminRecoveryOnly == oidc.primary`. `providerName` is best-effort label via `OidcProviderNameDeriver` (Logto / Keycloak / Auth0 / Okta / Single Sign-On). The SPA hides the local form behind `?local` when `adminRecoveryOnly` is true.
 
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ Env-scoped read-path controllers (`AlertController`, `AlertRuleController`, `Ale
 - `SecurityConfig` — WebSecurityFilterChain, JWT filter, CORS, OIDC conditional. `/api/v1/admin/outbound-connections/**` GETs permit OPERATOR in addition to ADMIN (defense-in-depth at controller level); mutations remain ADMIN-only. Alerting matchers: GET `/environments/*/alerts/**` VIEWER+; POST/PUT/DELETE rules and silences OPERATOR+; ack/read/bulk-read VIEWER+; POST `/alerts/notifications/*/retry` OPERATOR+.
 - `JwtAuthenticationFilter` — OncePerRequestFilter, validates Bearer tokens
 - `JwtServiceImpl` — HMAC-SHA256 JWT (Nimbus JOSE)
-- `UiAuthController` — `/api/v1/auth` (login, refresh, me). Upserts `users.user_id = request.username()` (bare); signs JWTs with `subject = "user:" + userId`. `refresh`/`me` strip the `"user:"` prefix from incoming subjects via `stripSubjectPrefix()` before any DB/RBAC lookup.
+- `UiAuthController` — `/api/v1/auth` (login, refresh, me, logout). Upserts `users.user_id = request.username()` (bare); signs JWTs with `subject = "user:" + userId`. `refresh`/`me`/`logout` strip the `"user:"` prefix from incoming subjects via `stripSubjectPrefix()` before any DB/RBAC lookup. `logout` revokes outstanding tokens by writing `users.token_revoked_before` and audits under `AuditCategory.AUTH / logout`.
 - `OidcAuthController` — `/api/v1/auth/oidc` (login-uri, token-exchange, logout). Upserts `users.user_id = "oidc:" + oidcUser.subject()` (no `user:` prefix); signs JWTs with `subject = "user:oidc:" + oidcUser.subject()`. `applyClaimMappings` + `getSystemRoleNames` calls all use the bare `oidc:<sub>` form.
 - `OidcTokenExchanger` — code -> tokens, role extraction from access_token then id_token
 - `OidcProviderHelper` — OIDC discovery, JWK source cache

cameleer-server-app/src/main/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/JwtAuthenticationFilter.java

@@ -84,9 +84,12 @@ public class JwtAuthenticationFilter extends OncePerRequestFilter {
             JwtValidationResult result = jwtService.validateAccessToken(token);
             String subject = result.subject();
 
-            // Token revocation check: reject tokens issued before revocation timestamp
+            // Token revocation check: reject tokens issued before revocation timestamp.
+            // JWT subject carries the "user:" prefix; users.user_id is the bare form
+            // (see CLAUDE.md "User ID conventions"). Strip before lookup.
             if (subject.startsWith("user:") && result.issuedAt() != null) {
-                userRepository.findById(subject).ifPresent(user -> {
+                String userId = subject.substring(5);
+                userRepository.findById(userId).ifPresent(user -> {
                     Instant revoked = user.tokenRevokedBefore();
                     if (revoked != null && result.issuedAt().isBefore(revoked)) {
                         serverMetrics.recordAuthFailure("revoked");

cameleer-server-app/src/main/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/UiAuthController.java

@@ -183,6 +183,26 @@ public class UiAuthController {
         return ResponseEntity.ok(detail);
     }
 
+    @PostMapping("/logout")
+    @Operation(summary = "Log out the current user (revoke all outstanding tokens)")
+    @ApiResponse(responseCode = "204", description = "Logged out (or no-op if not authenticated)")
+    public ResponseEntity<Void> logout(Authentication authentication, HttpServletRequest httpRequest) {
+        if (authentication == null || authentication.getName() == null
+                || !authentication.getName().startsWith("user:")) {
+            return ResponseEntity.noContent().build();
+        }
+        String userId = stripSubjectPrefix(authentication.getName());
+        // +1ms guards against same-millisecond races: JWT iat is quantised to
+        // milliseconds (Date.from(now) in JwtServiceImpl), and the filter check
+        // is strict isBefore. Without the bump, a token issued in the same
+        // millisecond as logout would survive revocation.
+        userRepository.revokeTokensBefore(userId, Instant.now().plusMillis(1));
+        auditService.log(userId, "logout", AuditCategory.AUTH, null, null,
+                AuditResult.SUCCESS, httpRequest);
+        log.info("UI user logged out: {}", userId);
+        return ResponseEntity.noContent().build();
+    }
+
     /**
      * Map a JWT subject ({@code "user:<name>"} or {@code "user:oidc:<sub>"}) to the DB key:
      * just the bare username. FKs on {@code alert_rules.created_by},

cameleer-server-app/src/test/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/JwtRevocationIT.java

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+package com.cameleer.server.app.security;
+
+import com.cameleer.server.app.AbstractPostgresIT;
+import com.cameleer.server.core.security.JwtService;
+import com.cameleer.server.core.security.UserInfo;
+import com.cameleer.server.core.security.UserRepository;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
+import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
+import org.springframework.boot.test.web.client.TestRestTemplate;
+import org.springframework.http.HttpEntity;
+import org.springframework.http.HttpHeaders;
+import org.springframework.http.HttpMethod;
+import org.springframework.http.HttpStatus;
+import org.springframework.http.ResponseEntity;
+
+import java.time.Instant;
+import java.util.List;
+
+import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
+
+/**
+ * Integration test verifying that {@code users.token_revoked_before} is honoured
+ * by {@link JwtAuthenticationFilter}. Regression for the prefix-mismatch bug
+ * where the filter looked up the JWT subject ({@code user:alice}) against
+ * {@code users.user_id} (bare {@code alice}), so revocation never fired.
+ */
+class JwtRevocationIT extends AbstractPostgresIT {
+
+    @Autowired
+    private TestRestTemplate restTemplate;
+
+    @Autowired
+    private JwtService jwtService;
+
+    @Autowired
+    private UserRepository userRepository;
+
+    @AfterEach
+    void cleanup() {
+        userRepository.delete("revoke-me");
+        userRepository.delete("never-revoked");
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void revokedTokenIsRejectedOnAuthenticatedRequest() {
+        userRepository.upsert(new UserInfo(
+                "revoke-me", "local", "", "Revoke Me", Instant.now()));
+        String accessToken = jwtService.createAccessToken(
+                "user:revoke-me", "user", List.of("VIEWER"));
+
+        ResponseEntity<String> before = call(accessToken);
+        assertThat(before.getStatusCode()).isEqualTo(HttpStatus.OK);
+
+        userRepository.revokeTokensBefore("revoke-me", Instant.now().plusSeconds(1));
+
+        ResponseEntity<String> after = call(accessToken);
+        assertThat(after.getStatusCode()).isEqualTo(HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void unrevokedUserTokenIsAccepted() {
+        userRepository.upsert(new UserInfo(
+                "never-revoked", "local", "", "Never Revoked", Instant.now()));
+        String accessToken = jwtService.createAccessToken(
+                "user:never-revoked", "user", List.of("VIEWER"));
+
+        ResponseEntity<String> resp = call(accessToken);
+        assertThat(resp.getStatusCode()).isEqualTo(HttpStatus.OK);
+    }
+
+    private ResponseEntity<String> call(String accessToken) {
+        HttpHeaders headers = new HttpHeaders();
+        headers.setBearerAuth(accessToken);
+        return restTemplate.exchange(
+                "/api/v1/auth/me",
+                HttpMethod.GET,
+                new HttpEntity<>(headers),
+                String.class);
+    }
+}

cameleer-server-app/src/test/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/LogoutControllerIT.java

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+package com.cameleer.server.app.security;
+
+import com.cameleer.server.app.AbstractPostgresIT;
+import com.cameleer.server.core.security.JwtService;
+import com.cameleer.server.core.security.UserInfo;
+import com.cameleer.server.core.security.UserRepository;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
+import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
+import org.springframework.boot.test.web.client.TestRestTemplate;
+import org.springframework.http.HttpEntity;
+import org.springframework.http.HttpHeaders;
+import org.springframework.http.HttpMethod;
+import org.springframework.http.HttpStatus;
+import org.springframework.http.ResponseEntity;
+import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate;
+
+import java.time.Instant;
+import java.util.List;
+
+import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
+
+class LogoutControllerIT extends AbstractPostgresIT {
+
+    @Autowired TestRestTemplate restTemplate;
+    @Autowired JwtService jwtService;
+    @Autowired UserRepository userRepository;
+    @Autowired JdbcTemplate jdbc;
+
+    @AfterEach
+    void cleanup() {
+        userRepository.delete("logout-test");
+        jdbc.update("DELETE FROM audit_log WHERE username = ?", "logout-test");
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void logoutRevokesTokensAuditsAndRejectsSubsequentCalls() {
+        userRepository.upsert(new UserInfo("logout-test", "local", "", "Logout Test", Instant.now()));
+        String accessToken = jwtService.createAccessToken("user:logout-test", "user", List.of("VIEWER"));
+
+        HttpHeaders authed = new HttpHeaders();
+        authed.setBearerAuth(accessToken);
+
+        ResponseEntity<Void> logoutResp = restTemplate.exchange(
+                "/api/v1/auth/logout", HttpMethod.POST, new HttpEntity<>(authed), Void.class);
+        assertThat(logoutResp.getStatusCode()).isEqualTo(HttpStatus.NO_CONTENT);
+
+        Instant revokedAt = jdbc.queryForObject(
+                "SELECT token_revoked_before FROM users WHERE user_id = ?",
+                (rs, n) -> rs.getTimestamp(1).toInstant(), "logout-test");
+        assertThat(revokedAt).isAfter(Instant.now().minusSeconds(10));
+
+        Long auditCount = jdbc.queryForObject(
+                "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM audit_log WHERE category = 'AUTH' AND action = 'logout' AND username = ?",
+                Long.class, "logout-test");
+        assertThat(auditCount).isEqualTo(1L);
+
+        ResponseEntity<String> meResp = restTemplate.exchange(
+                "/api/v1/auth/me", HttpMethod.GET, new HttpEntity<>(authed), String.class);
+        assertThat(meResp.getStatusCode()).isEqualTo(HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void logoutWithoutTokenReturns204NoOp() {
+        ResponseEntity<Void> resp = restTemplate.exchange(
+                "/api/v1/auth/logout", HttpMethod.POST, HttpEntity.EMPTY, Void.class);
+        assertThat(resp.getStatusCode()).isEqualTo(HttpStatus.NO_CONTENT);
+    }
+}

docs/handoff/2026-04-27-logout-hardening.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# Logout Hardening — SaaS Handoff (2026-04-27)
+
+Action required by the cameleer-saas / Logto admin team before the cameleer-server logout fix is fully effective in customer environments.
+
+## What changed in cameleer-server
+
+The SPA now performs a proper OIDC RP-Initiated Logout: a top-level navigation to the IdP's `end_session_endpoint` with `id_token_hint`, `post_logout_redirect_uri`, and `client_id`. After Logto clears its session cookie it 302-redirects back to `post_logout_redirect_uri`.
+
+Previously the SPA fired a cross-origin `fetch(... {mode:'no-cors'})` which is a no-op for OIDC — Logto's session cookie only clears under a top-level browsing context. Result: the next SSO click silently re-authenticated the prior user.
+
+In addition, cameleer-server now exposes `POST /api/v1/auth/logout` which bumps `users.token_revoked_before = now().plusMillis(1)` for the calling user, invalidating every outstanding refresh + access token server-side. This protects against leaked-token scenarios that don't involve the IdP at all (XSS, copied bearer token, etc.). The `+1ms` guards against a same-millisecond race where a token issued in the exact ms of logout would otherwise survive the strict `isBefore` revocation check.
+
+The SPA logout flow is now:
+
+1. Best-effort `POST /api/v1/auth/logout` (server-side revocation).
+2. Clear `localStorage` + Zustand auth state.
+3. Set `sessionStorage['cameleer:signed_out'] = '1'` so the post-logout `/login` render shows a "You have been signed out successfully" splash instead of any auto-flow.
+4. `window.location.replace(end_session_endpoint?id_token_hint=…&post_logout_redirect_uri=…&client_id=…)` for OIDC users (top-level navigation), or `/login` for local users.
+
+`prompt=login` is also added to the OIDC authorization redirect on the way back in, as defence-in-depth: even if the IdP session cookie somehow survives logout, the IdP will re-prompt for credentials rather than silently re-authenticating.
+
+## What the SaaS team must do
+
+For **each cameleer-server tenant** registered as a Logto application, add the post-logout redirect URL to the application's allowed list:
+
+```
+Logto admin console
+  → Applications → <cameleer-server tenant client>
+    → Redirect URIs / Post sign-out redirect URIs
+       → add: https://<tenant-base-url>/login
+```
+
+Example values (replace `<tenant-base-url>` with the customer's actual deployment URL):
+
+| Tenant | Post sign-out redirect URI |
+|---|---|
+| acme-prod | `https://cameleer.acme.example.com/login` |
+| acme-staging | `https://cameleer.staging.acme.example.com/login` |
+| local-dev | `http://localhost:8081/login` |
+
+If the SPA is served under a non-root base path (`config.basePath` in `ui/src/config.ts`), include the base path in the URL — e.g. `https://host/cameleer/login`. Logto matches strictly; trailing-slash and scheme mismatches fail the redirect.
+
+## How to verify
+
+After adding the URI:
+
+1. Sign in to cameleer-server via SSO.
+2. Sign out from the user menu.
+3. Confirm the browser navigates through Logto's `end_session_endpoint` and lands on `/login` showing **"You have been signed out successfully."**
+4. Click "Sign in again" → "Sign in with Single Sign-On" — Logto **must** show its login screen, **not** silently re-authenticate.
+5. Sign in as a different user; confirm the dashboard reflects the new identity.
+
+If silent re-auth still happens after step 4, the most likely cause is that `prompt=login` is being stripped by an intermediary or the IdP doesn't honor it for the configured client. The SPA already sets `prompt=login` defensively; verify by inspecting the redirect URL in DevTools → Network.
+
+## Failure modes
+
+| Symptom | Likely cause | Fix |
+|---|---|---|
+| Browser lands on Logto error "invalid post_logout_redirect_uri" | URI not registered, or trailing-slash / scheme mismatch | Add exact URL in Logto admin (Logto matches strictly) |
+| User signs out, re-clicks SSO, lands back authenticated as same user | IdP session cookie not cleared — usually the end_session redirect failed to a Logto error page instead of the SPA's `/login` | Check Logto application → Audit logs for the failed `end_session` call; usually traces back to redirect URI registration |
+| 204 from `/api/v1/auth/logout` but the SPA still appears authenticated locally | SPA bug — file an issue (server side is verified by `LogoutControllerIT` and `JwtRevocationIT`) | n/a |
+| SPA splash never appears after logout | `sessionStorage['cameleer:signed_out']` not set, or `LoginPage` renders before `useState` initializer reads it — check `auth-store.logout` is being called before the navigation | Inspect `ui/src/auth/auth-store.ts:logout` |
+| Stolen token still works after victim logged out | `JwtAuthenticationFilter` revocation lookup is broken (the original bug, fixed in `7066795c`) | Confirm filter at `JwtAuthenticationFilter:91` strips `user:` before `findById`. `JwtRevocationIT` is the regression. |
+
+## Pointers
+
+- Plan: `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-27-logout-hardening.md`
+- Server endpoint: `cameleer-server-app/src/main/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/UiAuthController.java` `POST /logout`
+- Filter revocation check: `cameleer-server-app/src/main/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/JwtAuthenticationFilter.java:88-99`
+- SPA logout: `ui/src/auth/auth-store.ts` `logout`
+- SPA splash + `prompt=login`: `ui/src/auth/LoginPage.tsx`
+- Server ITs: `JwtRevocationIT`, `LogoutControllerIT` (both in `cameleer-server-app/src/test/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/`)
+- SaaS reference implementation: `cameleer-saas/ui/src/auth/useAuth.ts` (`@logto/react` `signOut(redirectUri)` + `cameleer:signed_out` sessionStorage flag pattern, mirrored here)
+
+## Verification
+
+### Automated (run on `feature/logout-hardening` HEAD `7837272a`, 2026-04-27)
+
+| Check | Outcome |
+|---|---|
+| `JwtRevocationIT` (2 tests — revoked-token rejected, unrevoked-token accepted) | ✅ PASS |
+| `LogoutControllerIT` (2 tests — authenticated logout revokes+audits+rejects subsequent calls; unauthenticated logout 204 no-op) | ✅ PASS |
+| Reactor build | ✅ BUILD SUCCESS |
+| `ui/ npm run typecheck` | ✅ 0 errors |
+| `ui/ npm run build` | ✅ built in 1.21s (pre-existing chunk-size warning unchanged, unrelated) |
+
+The pre-existing revocation-bug regression (token still works after logout) is now covered by `JwtRevocationIT.revokedTokenIsRejectedOnAuthenticatedRequest` and the end-to-end logout flow by `LogoutControllerIT.logoutRevokesTokensAuditsAndRejectsSubsequentCalls`. Both depend on the `JwtAuthenticationFilter` prefix-strip fix in commit `7066795c`.
+
+### Manual — required from the SaaS team
+
+- [ ] Register `https://<tenant-base-url>/login` as a `post_logout_redirect_uri` on the Logto application for each cameleer-server tenant (per the table above).
+- [ ] Local-user smoke (in a browser): sign in → sign out → confirm 204 from `/api/v1/auth/logout` in DevTools Network tab → confirm "Signed out successfully" splash → "Sign in again" → confirm local form re-renders cleanly.
+- [ ] OIDC-user smoke (in a browser, against Logto): sign in via SSO as user A → sign out → confirm top-level navigation through Logto's `end_session_endpoint` → land on splash → "Sign in again" → "Sign in with SSO" → confirm Logto **shows its login screen** (not silent re-auth) → sign in as user B → confirm dashboard reflects B (not A).
+- [ ] Stolen-token smoke: copy `cameleer-access-token` from localStorage → sign out → confirm `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" .../api/v1/auth/me` returns 401.
+
+The automated coverage proves the server-side revocation works. The manual checks prove the IdP-side session is also cleared and the UX flow is correct end-to-end.

docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-27-logout-hardening.md

@@ -0,0 +1,801 @@
+# Logout Hardening Implementation Plan
+
+> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
+
+**Goal:** Make logout fully invalidate the user's session — server-side JWT revocation, OIDC RP-initiated logout via top-level redirect, and a "signed out" landing experience that prevents accidental silent re-authentication.
+
+**Architecture:** Three layers. (1) Server adds `POST /api/v1/auth/logout` that bumps `users.token_revoked_before = now()`, killing all outstanding refresh + access tokens via the existing `JwtAuthenticationFilter` revocation check. (2) SPA replaces the broken `fetch(end_session, {mode:'no-cors'})` with a proper top-level navigation to the OIDC `end_session_endpoint`, passing `id_token_hint` + `post_logout_redirect_uri` + `client_id`. (3) A `cameleer:signed_out` `sessionStorage` flag lets the post-logout `LoginPage` confirm the action and prevents auto-flow loops; `prompt=login` on the OIDC auth request adds defence-in-depth for IdPs that retain credential caches outside the session cookie.
+
+**Tech Stack:** Spring Boot 3 + Spring Security (server), React + Zustand + TypeScript (SPA), JUnit 5 + Spring Boot Test + Testcontainers (IT), OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0.
+
+**Validates against:** cameleer-saas `ui/src/auth/useAuth.ts` + `LoginPage.tsx` (Logto SDK reference implementation).
+
+**Pre-existing bug fixed in passing:** `JwtAuthenticationFilter.java:89` calls `userRepository.findById(subject)` with the prefixed JWT subject (`user:alice`), but `users.user_id` is bare (`alice`). Result: the token-revocation feature has been silently inert since it was added. The new logout endpoint depends on this working, so the fix is Task 1.
+
+---
+
+## File Structure
+
+**Server (`cameleer-server-app/`):**
+
+| File | Action | Responsibility |
+|---|---|---|
+| `src/main/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/JwtAuthenticationFilter.java` | Modify | Strip `user:` prefix before `findById` so revocation actually fires |
+| `src/main/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/UiAuthController.java` | Modify | Add `POST /logout` |
+| `src/test/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/JwtRevocationIT.java` | Create | Regression: revoked tokens are rejected |
+| `src/test/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/LogoutControllerIT.java` | Create | End-to-end: login → logout → token rejected; audit row written |
+
+**SPA (`ui/`):**
+
+| File | Action | Responsibility |
+|---|---|---|
+| `src/auth/auth-store.ts` | Modify | New `logout()`: server call → clear local state → set signed_out flag → top-level redirect to `end_session_endpoint` |
+| `src/auth/LoginPage.tsx` | Modify | Read `signed_out` flag → render "Signed out" card; add `prompt=login` to OIDC redirect |
+| `src/api/schema.d.ts` | Regen | Picks up new `/auth/logout` endpoint |
+| `src/api/openapi.json` | Regen | Source for schema regen |
+
+**Rules / docs:**
+
+| File | Action | Responsibility |
+|---|---|---|
+| `.claude/rules/app-classes.md` | Modify | Document `POST /auth/logout` on `UiAuthController` listing |
+| `docs/handoff/2026-04-27-logout-hardening.md` | Create | SaaS-side operational note: register `post_logout_redirect_uri` per cameleer-server tenant in Logto |
+
+---
+
+## Task 1: Fix the pre-existing revocation lookup bug (TDD regression)
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `cameleer-server-app/src/main/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/JwtAuthenticationFilter.java:88-96`
+- Create: `cameleer-server-app/src/test/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/JwtRevocationIT.java`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing IT**
+
+Create `cameleer-server-app/src/test/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/JwtRevocationIT.java`:
+
+```java
+package com.cameleer.server.app.security;
+
+import com.cameleer.server.app.AbstractPostgresIT;
+import com.cameleer.server.core.security.JwtService;
+import com.cameleer.server.core.security.UserInfo;
+import com.cameleer.server.core.security.UserRepository;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
+import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
+import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
+import org.springframework.boot.test.web.server.LocalServerPort;
+import org.springframework.http.HttpEntity;
+import org.springframework.http.HttpHeaders;
+import org.springframework.http.HttpMethod;
+import org.springframework.http.HttpStatus;
+import org.springframework.http.ResponseEntity;
+import org.springframework.web.client.RestTemplate;
+
+import java.time.Instant;
+import java.util.List;
+
+import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
+
+@SpringBootTest(webEnvironment = SpringBootTest.WebEnvironment.RANDOM_PORT)
+class JwtRevocationIT extends AbstractPostgresIT {
+
+    @LocalServerPort int port;
+    @Autowired JwtService jwtService;
+    @Autowired UserRepository userRepository;
+
+    @Test
+    void revokedTokenIsRejectedOnAuthenticatedRequest() {
+        // Arrange: a user exists, holds a valid access token
+        userRepository.upsert(new UserInfo("revoke-me", "local", "", "Revoke Me", Instant.now()));
+        String accessToken = jwtService.createAccessToken("user:revoke-me", "user", List.of("VIEWER"));
+
+        // Sanity: token works before revocation
+        ResponseEntity<String> before = call(accessToken);
+        assertThat(before.getStatusCode()).isEqualTo(HttpStatus.OK);
+
+        // Act: revoke all tokens for this user
+        userRepository.revokeTokensBefore("revoke-me", Instant.now().plusSeconds(1));
+
+        // Assert: same token is now rejected
+        ResponseEntity<String> after = call(accessToken);
+        assertThat(after.getStatusCode()).isEqualTo(HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    private ResponseEntity<String> call(String accessToken) {
+        HttpHeaders headers = new HttpHeaders();
+        headers.setBearerAuth(accessToken);
+        return new RestTemplate().exchange(
+                "http://localhost:" + port + "/api/v1/auth/me",
+                HttpMethod.GET, new HttpEntity<>(headers), String.class);
+    }
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run test to verify it fails (proving the bug)**
+
+Run: `mvn -pl cameleer-server-app -Dtest=JwtRevocationIT verify`
+Expected: FAIL — the second `call()` returns 200 OK (revocation never fires because `findById("user:revoke-me")` returns empty).
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Fix the lookup**
+
+Modify `cameleer-server-app/src/main/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/JwtAuthenticationFilter.java:88-96`. Replace the block:
+
+```java
+            // Token revocation check: reject tokens issued before revocation timestamp
+            if (subject.startsWith("user:") && result.issuedAt() != null) {
+                userRepository.findById(subject).ifPresent(user -> {
+                    Instant revoked = user.tokenRevokedBefore();
+                    if (revoked != null && result.issuedAt().isBefore(revoked)) {
+                        serverMetrics.recordAuthFailure("revoked");
+                        throw new com.cameleer.server.core.security.InvalidTokenException("Token revoked");
+                    }
+                });
+            }
+```
+
+with:
+
+```java
+            // Token revocation check: reject tokens issued before revocation timestamp.
+            // JWT subject carries the "user:" prefix; users.user_id is the bare form
+            // (see CLAUDE.md "User ID conventions"). Strip before lookup.
+            if (subject.startsWith("user:") && result.issuedAt() != null) {
+                String userId = subject.substring(5);
+                userRepository.findById(userId).ifPresent(user -> {
+                    Instant revoked = user.tokenRevokedBefore();
+                    if (revoked != null && result.issuedAt().isBefore(revoked)) {
+                        serverMetrics.recordAuthFailure("revoked");
+                        throw new com.cameleer.server.core.security.InvalidTokenException("Token revoked");
+                    }
+                });
+            }
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Run test to verify it passes**
+
+Run: `mvn -pl cameleer-server-app -Dtest=JwtRevocationIT verify`
+Expected: PASS.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add cameleer-server-app/src/main/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/JwtAuthenticationFilter.java \
+        cameleer-server-app/src/test/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/JwtRevocationIT.java
+git commit -m "fix(auth): strip user: prefix before token-revocation lookup
+
+JwtAuthenticationFilter compared the JWT subject (user:alice) against
+users.user_id (bare alice), so token_revoked_before was never read for
+any user. Strips the prefix to match the convention documented in
+CLAUDE.md. Adds JwtRevocationIT as a regression."
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 2: Add `POST /api/v1/auth/logout`
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `cameleer-server-app/src/main/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/UiAuthController.java`
+- Create: `cameleer-server-app/src/test/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/LogoutControllerIT.java`
+
+`/api/v1/auth/**` is `permitAll()` in `SecurityConfig.java:92`. We keep that and let the controller read `Authentication` opportunistically — if no token (already expired or missing), return 204 no-op so the SPA's best-effort call never fails.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing IT**
+
+Create `cameleer-server-app/src/test/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/LogoutControllerIT.java`:
+
+```java
+package com.cameleer.server.app.security;
+
+import com.cameleer.server.app.AbstractPostgresIT;
+import com.cameleer.server.core.security.JwtService;
+import com.cameleer.server.core.security.UserInfo;
+import com.cameleer.server.core.security.UserRepository;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
+import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.Autowired;
+import org.springframework.boot.test.context.SpringBootTest;
+import org.springframework.boot.test.web.server.LocalServerPort;
+import org.springframework.http.*;
+import org.springframework.jdbc.core.JdbcTemplate;
+import org.springframework.web.client.RestTemplate;
+
+import java.time.Instant;
+import java.util.List;
+
+import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
+
+@SpringBootTest(webEnvironment = SpringBootTest.WebEnvironment.RANDOM_PORT)
+class LogoutControllerIT extends AbstractPostgresIT {
+
+    @LocalServerPort int port;
+    @Autowired JwtService jwtService;
+    @Autowired UserRepository userRepository;
+    @Autowired JdbcTemplate jdbc;
+
+    @Test
+    void logoutRevokesTokensAuditsAndRejectsSubsequentCalls() {
+        userRepository.upsert(new UserInfo("logout-test", "local", "", "Logout Test", Instant.now()));
+        String accessToken = jwtService.createAccessToken("user:logout-test", "user", List.of("VIEWER"));
+
+        // POST /auth/logout
+        HttpHeaders authed = new HttpHeaders();
+        authed.setBearerAuth(accessToken);
+        ResponseEntity<Void> logoutResp = new RestTemplate().exchange(
+                "http://localhost:" + port + "/api/v1/auth/logout",
+                HttpMethod.POST, new HttpEntity<>(authed), Void.class);
+        assertThat(logoutResp.getStatusCode()).isEqualTo(HttpStatus.NO_CONTENT);
+
+        // token_revoked_before is set
+        Instant revokedAt = jdbc.queryForObject(
+                "SELECT token_revoked_before FROM users WHERE user_id = ?",
+                (rs, n) -> rs.getTimestamp(1).toInstant(), "logout-test");
+        assertThat(revokedAt).isAfter(Instant.now().minusSeconds(10));
+
+        // Audit row written
+        Long auditCount = jdbc.queryForObject(
+                "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM audit_log WHERE category = 'AUTH' AND action = 'logout' AND username = ?",
+                Long.class, "logout-test");
+        assertThat(auditCount).isEqualTo(1L);
+
+        // Same token now rejected
+        ResponseEntity<String> meResp = new RestTemplate().exchange(
+                "http://localhost:" + port + "/api/v1/auth/me",
+                HttpMethod.GET, new HttpEntity<>(authed), String.class);
+        assertThat(meResp.getStatusCode()).isEqualTo(HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void logoutWithoutTokenReturns204NoOp() {
+        ResponseEntity<Void> resp = new RestTemplate().exchange(
+                "http://localhost:" + port + "/api/v1/auth/logout",
+                HttpMethod.POST, HttpEntity.EMPTY, Void.class);
+        assertThat(resp.getStatusCode()).isEqualTo(HttpStatus.NO_CONTENT);
+    }
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run test to verify it fails**
+
+Run: `mvn -pl cameleer-server-app -Dtest=LogoutControllerIT verify`
+Expected: FAIL — endpoint does not exist (404).
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Add the endpoint**
+
+Modify `cameleer-server-app/src/main/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/UiAuthController.java`. Add this method right after the `me(...)` method (before `stripSubjectPrefix`):
+
+```java
+    @PostMapping("/logout")
+    @Operation(summary = "Log out the current user (revoke all outstanding tokens)")
+    @ApiResponse(responseCode = "204", description = "Logged out (or no-op if not authenticated)")
+    public ResponseEntity<Void> logout(Authentication authentication, HttpServletRequest httpRequest) {
+        if (authentication == null || authentication.getName() == null
+                || !authentication.getName().startsWith("user:")) {
+            // Best-effort: SPA calls this even when its token is already gone.
+            return ResponseEntity.noContent().build();
+        }
+        String userId = stripSubjectPrefix(authentication.getName());
+        userRepository.revokeTokensBefore(userId, Instant.now());
+        auditService.log(userId, "logout", AuditCategory.AUTH, null, null,
+                AuditResult.SUCCESS, httpRequest);
+        log.info("UI user logged out: {}", userId);
+        return ResponseEntity.noContent().build();
+    }
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Run test to verify it passes**
+
+Run: `mvn -pl cameleer-server-app -Dtest=LogoutControllerIT verify`
+Expected: PASS (both tests).
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add cameleer-server-app/src/main/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/UiAuthController.java \
+        cameleer-server-app/src/test/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/LogoutControllerIT.java
+git commit -m "feat(auth): add POST /auth/logout that revokes all user tokens
+
+Bumps users.token_revoked_before = now() for the calling user, audited
+under AuditCategory.AUTH. Best-effort: returns 204 even when the request
+is unauthenticated, so the SPA can call it on every logout regardless of
+token state. Token-rejection is enforced by the existing
+JwtAuthenticationFilter revocation check (fixed in the previous commit)."
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 3: Regenerate OpenAPI schema for SPA consumption
+
+Per CLAUDE.md "Regenerating OpenAPI schema (SPA types)" — required for every controller-level change.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Build and run the server**
+
+```bash
+mvn -pl cameleer-server-app -DskipTests package
+java -jar cameleer-server-app/target/cameleer-server-app-*.jar &
+```
+
+Wait until `Started CameleerServerApplication` appears in logs (port 8081 by default).
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Regenerate the schema**
+
+```bash
+cd ui && npm run generate-api:live
+```
+
+Expected: `ui/src/api/openapi.json` and `ui/src/api/schema.d.ts` updated. Diff shows `/auth/logout` POST entry under `paths`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Stop the server, verify SPA still type-checks**
+
+```bash
+pkill -f cameleer-server-app
+cd ui && npm run typecheck
+```
+
+Expected: 0 errors.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add ui/src/api/openapi.json ui/src/api/schema.d.ts
+git commit -m "chore(ui): regenerate OpenAPI schema for /auth/logout"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 4: Refactor SPA `auth-store.ts` logout
+
+**File:** Modify `ui/src/auth/auth-store.ts`
+
+Replace the broken `fetch(end_session, {mode:'no-cors'})` with: (1) best-effort server `POST /auth/logout` to revoke tokens, (2) clear localStorage + Zustand state, (3) set `cameleer:signed_out` `sessionStorage` flag, (4) top-level redirect to `end_session_endpoint` for OIDC users, otherwise navigate to local `/login`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Replace the `logout` action**
+
+Modify `ui/src/auth/auth-store.ts:143-169`. Replace the entire `logout: () => { ... }` block with:
+
+```ts
+  logout: async () => {
+    const accessToken = get().accessToken;
+    const endSessionEndpoint = localStorage.getItem('cameleer-oidc-end-session');
+    const idToken = localStorage.getItem('cameleer-oidc-id-token');
+    const clientId = localStorage.getItem('cameleer-oidc-client-id');
+
+    // Best-effort server-side revocation. Don't await failures — the SPA
+    // logout must always proceed (e.g. token already expired).
+    if (accessToken) {
+      try {
+        await api.POST('/auth/logout', {});
+      } catch {
+        // ignore; client-side cleanup below is still authoritative for the SPA
+      }
+    }
+
+    clearTokens();
+    localStorage.removeItem('cameleer-oidc-end-session');
+    localStorage.removeItem('cameleer-oidc-id-token');
+    localStorage.removeItem('cameleer-oidc-client-id');
+    set({
+      accessToken: null,
+      refreshToken: null,
+      username: null,
+      roles: [],
+      isAuthenticated: false,
+      error: null,
+    });
+
+    // Mark the upcoming /login render so it shows a "Signed out" splash and
+    // does not silently re-enter any auto-flow. Mirrors cameleer-saas
+    // ui/src/auth/useAuth.ts pattern.
+    sessionStorage.setItem('cameleer:signed_out', '1');
+
+    const localLoginUrl = `${config.basePath}login`;
+
+    if (endSessionEndpoint && idToken) {
+      // OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0: top-level navigation, NOT fetch.
+      // Logto (and every compliant IdP) only clears its session cookie under
+      // a top-level browser request; cross-origin fetch leaves it intact.
+      const params = new URLSearchParams({
+        id_token_hint: idToken,
+        post_logout_redirect_uri: `${window.location.origin}${config.basePath}login`,
+      });
+      if (clientId) params.set('client_id', clientId);
+      window.location.replace(`${endSessionEndpoint}?${params}`);
+    } else {
+      window.location.replace(localLoginUrl);
+    }
+  },
+```
+
+Update the `AuthState` interface (top of file) to reflect the now-async signature:
+
+```ts
+  logout: () => Promise<void>;
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Persist `clientId` at OIDC initiation**
+
+Modify `ui/src/auth/LoginPage.tsx:77-79`. Replace:
+
+```ts
+      if (data.endSessionEndpoint) {
+        localStorage.setItem('cameleer-oidc-end-session', data.endSessionEndpoint);
+      }
+```
+
+with:
+
+```ts
+      if (data.endSessionEndpoint) {
+        localStorage.setItem('cameleer-oidc-end-session', data.endSessionEndpoint);
+      }
+      if (data.clientId) {
+        localStorage.setItem('cameleer-oidc-client-id', data.clientId);
+      }
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Type-check**
+
+```bash
+cd ui && npm run typecheck
+```
+
+Expected: 0 errors. The `logout` callers (only `useAuth.ts` and `LayoutShell.tsx`) accept a `() => void` signature and ignore the return; an async function is fire-and-forget compatible.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add ui/src/auth/auth-store.ts ui/src/auth/LoginPage.tsx
+git commit -m "fix(ui): proper OIDC logout — server revoke + top-level redirect
+
+Previous logout fired fetch(end_session, {mode:'no-cors'}), which is a
+no-op for OIDC: cross-origin fetch never clears the IdP's session cookie.
+Result: subsequent SSO clicks silently re-authenticated the prior user.
+
+New flow:
+1. Best-effort POST /auth/logout to bump token_revoked_before.
+2. Clear localStorage + Zustand state.
+3. Set sessionStorage 'cameleer:signed_out=1' so /login renders a
+   confirmation splash (mirrors cameleer-saas pattern).
+4. window.location.replace(end_session_endpoint?id_token_hint=…
+   &post_logout_redirect_uri=…&client_id=…) — top-level navigation, the
+   only form that actually clears the IdP session cookie.
+
+client_id is now persisted at OIDC initiation alongside
+end_session_endpoint and id_token, so logout has all three params
+without an extra round-trip."
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 5: SPA `LoginPage` — `prompt=login` + signed-out splash
+
+**File:** Modify `ui/src/auth/LoginPage.tsx`
+
+Two changes: (1) add `prompt=login` to the OIDC redirect (defence-in-depth), (2) read `cameleer:signed_out` flag and render a "Signed out" card with an explicit "Sign in again" button.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Add `prompt=login` to the OIDC redirect**
+
+Modify `ui/src/auth/LoginPage.tsx:82-90`. Replace:
+
+```ts
+      const params = new URLSearchParams({
+        response_type: 'code',
+        client_id: data.clientId,
+        redirect_uri: redirectUri,
+        scope: scopes.join(' '),
+      });
+      if (data.resource) params.set('resource', data.resource);
+      // Note: NO prompt=none. Per RFC 9700 §4.4, that's silent re-auth only;
+      // for first-time login it returns login_required and traps users on a local form.
+      window.location.href = `${data.authorizationEndpoint}?${params}`;
+```
+
+with:
+
+```ts
+      const params = new URLSearchParams({
+        response_type: 'code',
+        client_id: data.clientId,
+        redirect_uri: redirectUri,
+        scope: scopes.join(' '),
+        // Defence-in-depth: even if RP-Initiated Logout did not fully clear
+        // the IdP session (proxy/cookie edge cases), prompt=login forces the
+        // IdP to re-prompt for credentials instead of silent re-auth.
+        prompt: 'login',
+      });
+      if (data.resource) params.set('resource', data.resource);
+      window.location.href = `${data.authorizationEndpoint}?${params}`;
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Read the signed-out flag in `LoginPage`**
+
+Modify `ui/src/auth/LoginPage.tsx:41-50`. Replace:
+
+```ts
+export function LoginPage() {
+  const { isAuthenticated, login, loading, error } = useAuthStore();
+  const [searchParams] = useSearchParams();
+  const forceLocal = searchParams.has('local');
+  const subtitle = useMemo(() => SUBTITLES[Math.floor(Math.random() * SUBTITLES.length)], []);
+  const [username, setUsername] = useState('');
+  const [password, setPassword] = useState('');
+  const [oidcLoading, setOidcLoading] = useState(false);
+```
+
+with:
+
+```ts
+export function LoginPage() {
+  const { isAuthenticated, login, loading, error } = useAuthStore();
+  const [searchParams] = useSearchParams();
+  const forceLocal = searchParams.has('local');
+  const subtitle = useMemo(() => SUBTITLES[Math.floor(Math.random() * SUBTITLES.length)], []);
+  const [username, setUsername] = useState('');
+  const [password, setPassword] = useState('');
+  const [oidcLoading, setOidcLoading] = useState(false);
+
+  // Mirrors cameleer-saas: when logout sets this flag, render a "Signed out"
+  // confirmation instead of the regular form. The flag is one-shot — read +
+  // cleared on mount.
+  const [signedOut] = useState(() => {
+    const flag = sessionStorage.getItem('cameleer:signed_out');
+    if (flag) sessionStorage.removeItem('cameleer:signed_out');
+    return !!flag;
+  });
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Render the signed-out card**
+
+Inside `LoginPage`, after `if (capsLoading) return null;` and before the `oidcPrimary` line, insert:
+
+```tsx
+  if (signedOut) {
+    return (
+      <div className={styles.page}>
+        <Card className={styles.card}>
+          <div className={styles.loginForm}>
+            <div className={styles.logo}>
+              <img src={brandLogo} alt="" className={styles.logoImg} />
+              cameleer
+            </div>
+            <p className={styles.subtitle}>You have been signed out successfully.</p>
+            <Button
+              variant="primary"
+              onClick={() => { window.location.replace(`${config.basePath}login`); }}
+              className={styles.submitButton}
+            >
+              Sign in again
+            </Button>
+          </div>
+        </Card>
+      </div>
+    );
+  }
+```
+
+The button reload bounces back to `/login` — `signedOut` is `false` on the second render (flag was cleared in the `useState` initializer), so the regular form (or SSO button) renders.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Type-check + visual smoke**
+
+```bash
+cd ui && npm run typecheck
+cd ui && npm run dev   # in another shell — open http://localhost:5173/login
+```
+
+Manually: log in, click "Sign out" in the user menu, confirm:
+- Browser navigates to Logto end_session URL (not fetch).
+- Returns to `/login` with the "Signed out successfully" card.
+- "Sign in again" → SSO button visible → clicking it triggers Logto's login screen (not silent re-auth).
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add ui/src/auth/LoginPage.tsx
+git commit -m "feat(ui): signed-out splash + prompt=login on OIDC redirect
+
+Two defensive layers complementing the RP-Initiated Logout in the
+previous commit:
+
+1. cameleer:signed_out sessionStorage flag (set in auth-store.logout,
+   read+cleared in LoginPage) renders a 'You have been signed out
+   successfully' card with an explicit 'Sign in again' button. Mirrors
+   the cameleer-saas pattern (ui/src/auth/LoginPage.tsx).
+
+2. prompt=login on the OIDC authorization redirect forces the IdP to
+   re-prompt for credentials even if its session cookie somehow
+   survived RP-Initiated Logout (proxy, race, misconfigured
+   post_logout_redirect_uri). RFC 6749 §3.1.2.1 / OIDC Core 1.0 §3.1.2.1."
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 6: Update `.claude/rules/app-classes.md`
+
+**File:** Modify `.claude/rules/app-classes.md`
+
+Document the new endpoint so future sessions don't re-discover the URL surface from scratch.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Update the `UiAuthController` listing**
+
+Find the line:
+
+```
+- `UiAuthController` — `/api/v1/auth` (login, refresh, me). Local username/password against env-var admin or DB BCrypt hash. Lockout after 5 failed attempts.
+```
+
+(There are two near-identical lines — under "Auth (flat)" and under "security/ — Spring Security". Update both for consistency.)
+
+Replace each with:
+
+```
+- `UiAuthController` — `/api/v1/auth` (login, refresh, me, logout). Local username/password against env-var admin or DB BCrypt hash. Lockout after 5 failed attempts. `POST /logout` is permitAll — controller resolves the user from the access token if present, bumps `users.token_revoked_before = now()` to invalidate all outstanding refresh + access tokens (enforced by `JwtAuthenticationFilter`), audits `AuditCategory.AUTH / logout`, returns 204. Best-effort: 204 also when called without a token so the SPA's logout never fails on already-expired sessions.
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add .claude/rules/app-classes.md
+git commit -m "docs(rules): document POST /auth/logout on UiAuthController"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 7: SaaS-side operational handoff
+
+**File:** Create `docs/handoff/2026-04-27-logout-hardening.md`
+
+Document the cross-team requirement: SaaS team must register `post_logout_redirect_uri` for each cameleer-server tenant in Logto, otherwise the OIDC end_session call rejects with `invalid_request` and the user lands on a Logto error page instead of `/login`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the handoff doc**
+
+Create `docs/handoff/2026-04-27-logout-hardening.md`:
+
+````markdown
+# Logout Hardening — SaaS Handoff (2026-04-27)
+
+Action required by the cameleer-saas / Logto admin team before the cameleer-server logout fix is fully effective in customer environments.
+
+## What changed in cameleer-server
+
+The SPA now performs a proper OIDC RP-Initiated Logout: a top-level navigation to the IdP's `end_session_endpoint` with `id_token_hint`, `post_logout_redirect_uri`, and `client_id`. After Logto clears its session cookie it 302-redirects back to `post_logout_redirect_uri`.
+
+Previously the SPA fired a cross-origin `fetch(... {mode:'no-cors'})` which is a no-op for OIDC — Logto's session cookie only clears under a top-level browsing context. Result: the next SSO click silently re-authenticated the prior user.
+
+## What the SaaS team must do
+
+For **each cameleer-server tenant** registered as a Logto application, add the post-logout redirect URL to the application's allowed list:
+
+```
+Logto admin console
+  → Applications → <cameleer-server tenant client>
+    → Redirect URIs / Post sign-out redirect URIs
+       → add: https://<tenant-base-url>/login
+```
+
+Example values (replace `<tenant-base-url>` with the customer's actual deployment URL):
+
+| Tenant | Post sign-out redirect URI |
+|---|---|
+| acme-prod | `https://cameleer.acme.example.com/login` |
+| acme-staging | `https://cameleer.staging.acme.example.com/login` |
+| local-dev | `http://localhost:8081/login` |
+
+If the SPA is served under a non-root base path (`config.basePath` in `ui/src/config.ts`), include the base path in the URL — e.g. `https://host/cameleer/login`.
+
+## How to verify
+
+After adding the URI:
+
+1. Sign in to cameleer-server via SSO.
+2. Sign out from the user menu.
+3. Confirm the browser navigates through Logto and lands on `/login` showing "You have been signed out successfully."
+4. Click "Sign in again" → "Sign in with Single Sign-On" — Logto must show its login screen, **not** silently re-authenticate. (If silent re-auth still happens, `prompt=login` and `post_logout_redirect_uri` registration are both required; the SPA already sets `prompt=login` defensively, so the most likely missing piece is the redirect URI registration.)
+
+## Failure modes
+
+| Symptom | Likely cause | Fix |
+|---|---|---|
+| Browser lands on Logto error "invalid post_logout_redirect_uri" | URI not registered or trailing-slash mismatch | Add exact URL in Logto admin (Logto matches strictly) |
+| User signs out, re-clicks SSO, lands back authenticated as same user | Session cookie not cleared — happens if the logout request 302'd to an error page instead of completing | Check Logto application → Audit logs for the failed end_session call; usually the redirect URI |
+| 204 from `/api/v1/auth/logout` but still authenticated locally | SPA bug — file an issue (server side is verified by `LogoutControllerIT`) | n/a |
+
+## Pointers
+
+- Plan: `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-27-logout-hardening.md`
+- Server endpoint: `cameleer-server-app/.../security/UiAuthController.java` `POST /logout`
+- SPA logout: `ui/src/auth/auth-store.ts` `logout`
+- SaaS reference: `cameleer-saas/ui/src/auth/useAuth.ts` (`@logto/react` `signOut(redirectUri)`)
+````
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add docs/handoff/2026-04-27-logout-hardening.md
+git commit -m "docs(handoff): SaaS-side post_logout_redirect_uri requirement"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 8: Full-stack manual smoke test
+
+This is a verification step — no code changes. Execute against a running server with a real Logto instance reachable.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Run the full IT suite**
+
+```bash
+mvn -pl cameleer-server-app verify
+```
+
+Expected: 0 failures. `JwtRevocationIT` and `LogoutControllerIT` both green.
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run server + SPA against Logto**
+
+In one shell:
+
+```bash
+java -jar cameleer-server-app/target/cameleer-server-app-*.jar
+```
+
+In another:
+
+```bash
+cd ui && npm run dev
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Local-user logout smoke**
+
+1. Open http://localhost:5173/ → log in via the local form (env-var admin or seeded user).
+2. Click "Sign out".
+3. Open DevTools → Network: confirm `POST /api/v1/auth/logout` returned 204.
+4. Confirm the SPA landed on `/login` with the "Signed out successfully" card.
+5. Click "Sign in again" → confirm the local form is shown and works.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: OIDC-user logout smoke (Logto)**
+
+Required Logto config: `post_logout_redirect_uri` for the cameleer-server client must include `http://localhost:5173/login` (per Task 7).
+
+1. Reproduce the original bug first (optional sanity): `git stash`, log in via SSO as user A, log out, click SSO again — observe silent re-auth as A. `git stash pop`.
+2. With the fix applied: log in via SSO as user A.
+3. Click "Sign out".
+4. Network tab: confirm `POST /api/v1/auth/logout` → 204, then a top-level navigation to `<logto>/oidc/session/end?...` → 302 back to `/login`.
+5. Confirm the "Signed out" card renders.
+6. Click "Sign in again" → "Sign in with SSO" → Logto **must** show its login screen (not silent re-auth).
+7. Sign in as a *different* user B; confirm the dashboard reflects B's identity (not A's).
+8. Sign out as B → "Sign in again" → sign in as A → reflects A.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Token-revocation smoke**
+
+Verify a stolen-token scenario can't outlive a logout.
+
+1. Log in. In DevTools → Application → Local Storage, copy `cameleer-access-token`.
+2. In a separate browser/curl, hit an authenticated endpoint with that token — must return 200:
+   ```bash
+   curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" http://localhost:5173/api/v1/auth/me
+   ```
+3. Sign out in the original tab.
+4. Re-run the curl — must return 401.
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Document outcomes**
+
+Append to `docs/handoff/2026-04-27-logout-hardening.md` under a new "Verification" section: which steps were exercised, against which IdP, and any deviations from expected behavior. If any deviation surfaces, file an issue and link from the handoff.
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Commit any handoff updates**
+
+```bash
+git add docs/handoff/2026-04-27-logout-hardening.md
+git commit -m "docs(handoff): logout-hardening verification notes"
+```
+
+(Skip if no edits.)
+
+---
+
+## Self-review summary
+
+- ✅ **Server-side revocation** — Task 1 (regression fix) + Task 2 (endpoint).
+- ✅ **OIDC top-level redirect** — Task 4.
+- ✅ **`prompt=login` defence** — Task 5.
+- ✅ **Signed-out splash** — Task 5 (mirrors SaaS pattern).
+- ✅ **Logto config note** — Task 7.
+- ✅ **Rules updated** — Task 6.
+- ✅ **Manual end-to-end verification** — Task 8 covers local user, OIDC user, stolen-token scenarios.
+
+No tasks reference symbols not defined in earlier tasks. All code blocks are complete (no "TBD" or "similar to above"). Each task ends in a single atomic commit.

ui/src/api/schema.d.ts

@@ -753,6 +753,23 @@ export interface paths {
         patch?: never;
         trace?: never;
     };
+    "/auth/logout": {
+        parameters: {
+            query?: never;
+            header?: never;
+            path?: never;
+            cookie?: never;
+        };
+        get?: never;
+        put?: never;
+        /** Log out the current user (revoke all outstanding tokens) */
+        post: operations["logout"];
+        delete?: never;
+        options?: never;
+        head?: never;
+        patch?: never;
+        trace?: never;
+    };
     "/auth/login": {
         parameters: {
             query?: never;
@@ -2743,8 +2760,8 @@ export interface components {
         AttributeFilter: {
             key?: string;
             value?: string;
-            keyOnly?: boolean;
             wildcard?: boolean;
+            keyOnly?: boolean;
         };
         SearchRequest: {
             status?: string;
@@ -3652,7 +3669,7 @@ export interface components {
             /** @description Whether OIDC is configured AND enabled */
             enabled?: boolean;
             /** @description Best-effort display label, e.g. "Logto", "Keycloak", "Single Sign-On" */
-            providerName: string;
+            providerName?: string;
             /** @description When true, OIDC is the canonical entry point and the SPA hides the local form unless ?local is set */
             primary?: boolean;
         };
@@ -5864,6 +5881,24 @@ export interface operations {
             };
         };
     };
+    logout: {
+        parameters: {
+            query?: never;
+            header?: never;
+            path?: never;
+            cookie?: never;
+        };
+        requestBody?: never;
+        responses: {
+            /** @description Logged out (or no-op if not authenticated) */
+            204: {
+                headers: {
+                    [name: string]: unknown;
+                };
+                content?: never;
+            };
+        };
+    };
     login: {
         parameters: {
             query?: never;

ui/src/auth/LoginPage.tsx

@@ -47,11 +47,43 @@ export function LoginPage() {
   const [password, setPassword] = useState('');
   const [oidcLoading, setOidcLoading] = useState(false);
 
+  // Mirrors cameleer-saas: when logout sets this flag, render a "Signed out"
+  // confirmation instead of the regular form. The flag is one-shot — read +
+  // cleared on mount.
+  const [signedOut] = useState(() => {
+    const flag = sessionStorage.getItem('cameleer:signed_out');
+    if (flag) sessionStorage.removeItem('cameleer:signed_out');
+    return !!flag;
+  });
+
   const { data: caps, isError: capsFailed, isLoading: capsLoading } = useAuthCapabilities();
 
   if (isAuthenticated) return <Navigate to="/" replace />;
   if (capsLoading) return null;
 
+  if (signedOut) {
+    return (
+      <div className={styles.page}>
+        <Card className={styles.card}>
+          <div className={styles.loginForm}>
+            <div className={styles.logo}>
+              <img src={brandLogo} alt="" className={styles.logoImg} />
+              cameleer
+            </div>
+            <p className={styles.subtitle}>You have been signed out successfully.</p>
+            <Button
+              variant="primary"
+              onClick={() => { window.location.replace(`${config.basePath}login`); }}
+              className={styles.submitButton}
+            >
+              Sign in again
+            </Button>
+          </div>
+        </Card>
+      </div>
+    );
+  }
+
   const oidcPrimary = caps?.oidc?.primary === true;
   const adminRecoveryOnly = caps?.localAccounts?.adminRecoveryOnly === true;
   const providerName = caps?.oidc?.providerName || 'Single Sign-On';
@@ -77,6 +109,9 @@ export function LoginPage() {
       if (data.endSessionEndpoint) {
         localStorage.setItem('cameleer-oidc-end-session', data.endSessionEndpoint);
       }
+      if (data.clientId) {
+        localStorage.setItem('cameleer-oidc-client-id', data.clientId);
+      }
       const redirectUri = `${window.location.origin}${config.basePath}oidc/callback`;
       const scopes = ['openid', 'email', 'profile', ...PLATFORM_SCOPES, ...(data.additionalScopes || [])];
       const params = new URLSearchParams({
@@ -84,10 +119,13 @@ export function LoginPage() {
         client_id: data.clientId,
         redirect_uri: redirectUri,
         scope: scopes.join(' '),
+        // Defence-in-depth: even if RP-Initiated Logout did not fully clear
+        // the IdP session (proxy/cookie edge cases), prompt=login forces the
+        // IdP to re-prompt for credentials instead of silent re-auth.
+        // OIDC Core 1.0 §3.1.2.1.
+        prompt: 'login',
       });
       if (data.resource) params.set('resource', data.resource);
-      // Note: NO prompt=none. Per RFC 9700 §4.4, that's silent re-auth only;
-      // for first-time login it returns login_required and traps users on a local form.
       window.location.href = `${data.authorizationEndpoint}?${params}`;
     } catch {
       useAuthStore.setState({ error: 'OIDC configuration unavailable. Try the local form via /login?local.' });

ui/src/auth/auth-store.ts

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ interface AuthState {
   login: (username: string, password: string) => Promise<void>;
   loginWithOidcCode: (code: string, redirectUri: string) => Promise<void>;
   refresh: () => Promise<boolean>;
-  logout: () => void;
+  logout: () => Promise<void>;
 }
 
 function parseRolesFromJwt(token: string): string[] {
@@ -140,12 +140,26 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthState>((set, get) => ({
     }
   },
 
-  logout: () => {
+  logout: async () => {
+    const accessToken = get().accessToken;
     const endSessionEndpoint = localStorage.getItem('cameleer-oidc-end-session');
     const idToken = localStorage.getItem('cameleer-oidc-id-token');
+    const clientId = localStorage.getItem('cameleer-oidc-client-id');
+
+    // Best-effort server-side revocation. Don't fail logout if it errors —
+    // the SPA-side cleanup below is authoritative for the SPA.
+    if (accessToken) {
+      try {
+        await api.POST('/auth/logout', {});
+      } catch {
+        // ignore
+      }
+    }
+
     clearTokens();
     localStorage.removeItem('cameleer-oidc-end-session');
     localStorage.removeItem('cameleer-oidc-id-token');
+    localStorage.removeItem('cameleer-oidc-client-id');
     set({
       accessToken: null,
       refreshToken: null,
@@ -154,17 +168,24 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthState>((set, get) => ({
       isAuthenticated: false,
       error: null,
     });
-    const loginUrl = `${config.basePath}login`;
+
+    // Tell the upcoming /login render that this is a post-logout landing,
+    // not a fresh visit. Mirrors cameleer-saas ui/src/auth/useAuth.ts.
+    sessionStorage.setItem('cameleer:signed_out', '1');
+
+    const localLoginUrl = `${config.basePath}login`;
+
     if (endSessionEndpoint && idToken) {
+      // OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0: top-level navigation, NOT fetch.
+      // Cross-origin fetch never clears the IdP's session cookie.
       const params = new URLSearchParams({
         id_token_hint: idToken,
         post_logout_redirect_uri: `${window.location.origin}${config.basePath}login`,
       });
-      fetch(`${endSessionEndpoint}?${params}`, { mode: 'no-cors' }).finally(() => {
+      if (clientId) params.set('client_id', clientId);
-        window.location.href = loginUrl;
+      window.location.replace(`${endSessionEndpoint}?${params}`);
-      });
     } else {
-      window.location.href = loginUrl;
+      window.location.replace(localLoginUrl);
     }
   },
 }));