docs(handoff): SaaS-side post_logout_redirect_uri requirement
Operational note for the cameleer-saas / Logto admin team. Covers what changed in cameleer-server (RP-Initiated Logout via top-level redirect + POST /auth/logout server-side revocation + signed-out splash + prompt=login defence), what they need to register in Logto per tenant, how to verify, and a failure-mode runbook table. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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docs/handoff/2026-04-27-logout-hardening.md
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# Logout Hardening — SaaS Handoff (2026-04-27)
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Action required by the cameleer-saas / Logto admin team before the cameleer-server logout fix is fully effective in customer environments.
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## What changed in cameleer-server
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The SPA now performs a proper OIDC RP-Initiated Logout: a top-level navigation to the IdP's `end_session_endpoint` with `id_token_hint`, `post_logout_redirect_uri`, and `client_id`. After Logto clears its session cookie it 302-redirects back to `post_logout_redirect_uri`.
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Previously the SPA fired a cross-origin `fetch(... {mode:'no-cors'})` which is a no-op for OIDC — Logto's session cookie only clears under a top-level browsing context. Result: the next SSO click silently re-authenticated the prior user.
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In addition, cameleer-server now exposes `POST /api/v1/auth/logout` which bumps `users.token_revoked_before = now().plusMillis(1)` for the calling user, invalidating every outstanding refresh + access token server-side. This protects against leaked-token scenarios that don't involve the IdP at all (XSS, copied bearer token, etc.). The `+1ms` guards against a same-millisecond race where a token issued in the exact ms of logout would otherwise survive the strict `isBefore` revocation check.
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The SPA logout flow is now:
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1. Best-effort `POST /api/v1/auth/logout` (server-side revocation).
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2. Clear `localStorage` + Zustand auth state.
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3. Set `sessionStorage['cameleer:signed_out'] = '1'` so the post-logout `/login` render shows a "You have been signed out successfully" splash instead of any auto-flow.
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4. `window.location.replace(end_session_endpoint?id_token_hint=…&post_logout_redirect_uri=…&client_id=…)` for OIDC users (top-level navigation), or `/login` for local users.
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`prompt=login` is also added to the OIDC authorization redirect on the way back in, as defence-in-depth: even if the IdP session cookie somehow survives logout, the IdP will re-prompt for credentials rather than silently re-authenticating.
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## What the SaaS team must do
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For **each cameleer-server tenant** registered as a Logto application, add the post-logout redirect URL to the application's allowed list:
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```
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Logto admin console
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→ Applications → <cameleer-server tenant client>
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→ Redirect URIs / Post sign-out redirect URIs
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→ add: https://<tenant-base-url>/login
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```
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Example values (replace `<tenant-base-url>` with the customer's actual deployment URL):
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| Tenant | Post sign-out redirect URI |
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|---|---|
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| acme-prod | `https://cameleer.acme.example.com/login` |
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| acme-staging | `https://cameleer.staging.acme.example.com/login` |
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| local-dev | `http://localhost:8081/login` |
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If the SPA is served under a non-root base path (`config.basePath` in `ui/src/config.ts`), include the base path in the URL — e.g. `https://host/cameleer/login`. Logto matches strictly; trailing-slash and scheme mismatches fail the redirect.
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## How to verify
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After adding the URI:
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1. Sign in to cameleer-server via SSO.
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2. Sign out from the user menu.
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3. Confirm the browser navigates through Logto's `end_session_endpoint` and lands on `/login` showing **"You have been signed out successfully."**
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4. Click "Sign in again" → "Sign in with Single Sign-On" — Logto **must** show its login screen, **not** silently re-authenticate.
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5. Sign in as a different user; confirm the dashboard reflects the new identity.
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If silent re-auth still happens after step 4, the most likely cause is that `prompt=login` is being stripped by an intermediary or the IdP doesn't honor it for the configured client. The SPA already sets `prompt=login` defensively; verify by inspecting the redirect URL in DevTools → Network.
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## Failure modes
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| Symptom | Likely cause | Fix |
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|---|---|---|
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| Browser lands on Logto error "invalid post_logout_redirect_uri" | URI not registered, or trailing-slash / scheme mismatch | Add exact URL in Logto admin (Logto matches strictly) |
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| User signs out, re-clicks SSO, lands back authenticated as same user | IdP session cookie not cleared — usually the end_session redirect failed to a Logto error page instead of the SPA's `/login` | Check Logto application → Audit logs for the failed `end_session` call; usually traces back to redirect URI registration |
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| 204 from `/api/v1/auth/logout` but the SPA still appears authenticated locally | SPA bug — file an issue (server side is verified by `LogoutControllerIT` and `JwtRevocationIT`) | n/a |
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| SPA splash never appears after logout | `sessionStorage['cameleer:signed_out']` not set, or `LoginPage` renders before `useState` initializer reads it — check `auth-store.logout` is being called before the navigation | Inspect `ui/src/auth/auth-store.ts:logout` |
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| Stolen token still works after victim logged out | `JwtAuthenticationFilter` revocation lookup is broken (the original bug, fixed in `7066795c`) | Confirm filter at `JwtAuthenticationFilter:91` strips `user:` before `findById`. `JwtRevocationIT` is the regression. |
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## Pointers
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- Plan: `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-27-logout-hardening.md`
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- Server endpoint: `cameleer-server-app/src/main/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/UiAuthController.java` `POST /logout`
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- Filter revocation check: `cameleer-server-app/src/main/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/JwtAuthenticationFilter.java:88-99`
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- SPA logout: `ui/src/auth/auth-store.ts` `logout`
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- SPA splash + `prompt=login`: `ui/src/auth/LoginPage.tsx`
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- Server ITs: `JwtRevocationIT`, `LogoutControllerIT` (both in `cameleer-server-app/src/test/java/com/cameleer/server/app/security/`)
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- SaaS reference implementation: `cameleer-saas/ui/src/auth/useAuth.ts` (`@logto/react` `signOut(redirectUri)` + `cameleer:signed_out` sessionStorage flag pattern, mirrored here)
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## Verification (filled in during Task 8)
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_Pending — see Task 8 of `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-27-logout-hardening.md` for the smoke-test results._
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