feat(runtime): harden tenant containers + auto-detect gVisor (#152)

Tenant JARs are arbitrary user code: Camel ships components (camel-exec,
camel-bean, MVEL/Groovy templating) that turn a header into shell, and
Java 17 has no SecurityManager — the JVM is not a security boundary.
This applies an unconditional hardening contract to every tenant
container so a single runc CVE no longer equals host takeover.

DockerRuntimeOrchestrator.startContainer now sets:
- cap_drop ALL (Capability.values() — docker-java has no ALL constant)
- security_opt: no-new-privileges, apparmor=docker-default
  (default seccomp profile applies implicitly)
- read_only rootfs, pids_limit=512
- /tmp tmpfs rw,nosuid,size=256m — no noexec, since Netty/Snappy/LZ4/Zstd
  dlopen native libs from /tmp via mmap(PROT_EXEC) which noexec blocks

The orchestrator also probes `docker info` at construction and uses runsc
(gVisor) automatically when the daemon has it registered. Override via
cameleer.server.runtime.dockerruntime (e.g. "kata"); empty = auto.

Outbound TCP, DNS, and TLS are unaffected — caps/seccomp don't gate
those — so vanilla Camel-Kafka producers/consumers and REST integrations
keep working unchanged. Stateful tenants (Kafka Streams with on-disk
state stores, apps writing to /var/log/...) need explicit writeable
volumes; that's tracked in #153 as the natural follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
hsiegeln
2026-04-25 20:58:26 +02:00
parent c5b6f2bbad
commit 8e9ad47077
4 changed files with 296 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,18 @@ When deployed via the cameleer-saas platform, this server orchestrates customer
- **ContainerLogForwarder** (`app/runtime/ContainerLogForwarder.java`) — streams Docker container stdout/stderr to ClickHouse `logs` table with `source='container'`. Uses `docker logs --follow` per container, batches lines every 2s or 50 lines. Parses Docker timestamp prefix, infers log level via regex. `DeploymentExecutor` starts capture after each replica launches with the replica's `instanceId` (`{envSlug}-{appSlug}-{replicaIndex}-{generation}`); `DockerEventMonitor` stops capture on die/oom. 60-second max capture timeout with 30s cleanup scheduler. Thread pool of 10 daemon threads. Container logs use the same `instanceId` as the agent (set via `CAMELEER_AGENT_INSTANCEID` env var) for unified log correlation at the instance level. Instance-id changes per deployment — cross-deploy queries aggregate on `application + environment` (and optionally `replica_index`).
- **StartupLogPanel** (`ui/src/components/StartupLogPanel.tsx`) — collapsible log panel rendered below `DeploymentProgress`. Queries `/api/v1/logs?source=container&application={appSlug}&environment={envSlug}`. Auto-polls every 3s while deployment is STARTING; shows green "live" badge during polling, red "stopped" badge on FAILED. Uses `useStartupLogs` hook and `LogViewer` (design system).
## Container Hardening (issue #152)
`DockerRuntimeOrchestrator.startContainer` applies an unconditional hardening contract to every tenant container — Java 17 has no SecurityManager so the JVM is not a security boundary, and isolation must live below it. Defaults are fail-closed and have no opt-out:
- `cap_drop` = every `Capability.values()` (effectively ALL — docker-java's enum has no `ALL` constant). Outbound TCP still works (no caps needed); raw sockets, ptrace, mounts, and bind <1024 are denied.
- `security_opt`: `no-new-privileges:true`, `apparmor=docker-default`. Default seccomp profile is applied implicitly when `seccomp=` is absent.
- `read_only` rootfs = true.
- `pids_limit` = 512 (`PIDS_LIMIT` constant).
- `tmpfs` mount: `/tmp` with `rw,nosuid,size=256m`. **No `noexec`** — Netty/tcnative, Snappy, LZ4, Zstd dlopen native libs from `/tmp` via `mmap(PROT_EXEC)` which `noexec` blocks. Issue #153 will add per-app `writeableVolumes` for stateful tenants (Kafka Streams etc.).
**Sandboxed runtime auto-detect**: at construction the orchestrator calls `dockerClient.infoCmd().exec().getRuntimes()` and uses `runsc` (gVisor) when present. Override with `cameleer.server.runtime.dockerruntime` (e.g. `kata` to force Kata Containers, or any other registered runtime). Empty/blank = auto. The override always wins over auto-detect. The `DockerRuntimeOrchestrator(DockerClient, String)` constructor is the canonical entry point; the single-arg constructor exists only as a convenience for tests that don't need an override.
## DeploymentExecutor Details
Primary network for app containers is set via `CAMELEER_SERVER_RUNTIME_DOCKERNETWORK` env var (in SaaS mode: `cameleer-tenant-{slug}`); apps also connect to `cameleer-traefik` (routing) and `cameleer-env-{tenantId}-{envSlug}` (per-environment discovery) as additional networks. Resolves `runtimeType: auto` to concrete type from `AppVersion.detectedRuntimeType` at PRE_FLIGHT (fails deployment if unresolvable). Builds Docker entrypoint per runtime type (all JVM types use `-javaagent:/app/agent.jar -jar`, plain Java uses `-cp` with main class, native runs binary directly). Sets per-replica `CAMELEER_AGENT_INSTANCEID` env var to `{envSlug}-{appSlug}-{replicaIndex}-{generation}` so container logs and agent logs share the same instance identity. Sets `CAMELEER_AGENT_*` env vars from `ResolvedContainerConfig` (routeControlEnabled, replayEnabled, health port). These are startup-only agent properties — changing them requires redeployment.