Migrate config to cameleer.server.* naming convention

Move all configuration properties under the cameleer.server.* namespace
with all-lowercase dot-separated names and mechanical env var mapping
(dots→underscores, uppercase). This aligns with the agent's convention
(cameleer.agent.*) and establishes a predictable pattern across all
components.

Changes:
- Move 6 config prefixes under cameleer.server.*: agent-registry,
  ingestion, security, license, clickhouse, and cameleer.tenant/runtime/indexer
- Rename all kebab-case properties to concatenated lowercase
  (e.g., bootstrap-token → bootstraptoken, jar-storage-path → jarstoragepath)
- Update all env vars to CAMELEER_SERVER_* mechanical mapping
- Fix container-cpu-request/container-cpu-shares mismatch bug
- Remove displayName from AgentRegistrationRequest (redundant with instanceId)
- Update agent container env vars to CAMELEER_AGENT_* convention
- Update K8s manifests and CI workflow for new env var names
- Update CLAUDE.md, HOWTO.md, SERVER-CAPABILITIES.md documentation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

CLAUDE.md

@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ java -jar cameleer3-server-app/target/cameleer3-server-app-1.0-SNAPSHOT.jar
 
 **runtime/** — Docker orchestration
 - `DockerRuntimeOrchestrator` — implements RuntimeOrchestrator; Docker Java client (zerodep transport), container lifecycle
-- `DeploymentExecutor` — @Async staged deploy: PRE_FLIGHT -> PULL_IMAGE -> CREATE_NETWORK -> START_REPLICAS -> HEALTH_CHECK -> SWAP_TRAFFIC -> COMPLETE. Primary network for app containers is set via `CAMELEER_DOCKER_NETWORK` env var (in SaaS mode: `cameleer-tenant-{slug}`); apps also connect to `cameleer-traefik` (routing) and `cameleer-env-{tenantId}-{envSlug}` (per-environment discovery) as additional networks. Sets `CAMELEER_ROUTE_CONTROL_ENABLED` and `CAMELEER_REPLAY_ENABLED` from `ResolvedContainerConfig` (default: true, configurable per environment/app via `defaultContainerConfig`/`containerConfig` JSONB). These are startup-only agent properties — changing them requires redeployment.
+- `DeploymentExecutor` — @Async staged deploy: PRE_FLIGHT -> PULL_IMAGE -> CREATE_NETWORK -> START_REPLICAS -> HEALTH_CHECK -> SWAP_TRAFFIC -> COMPLETE. Primary network for app containers is set via `CAMELEER_SERVER_RUNTIME_DOCKERNETWORK` env var (in SaaS mode: `cameleer-tenant-{slug}`); apps also connect to `cameleer-traefik` (routing) and `cameleer-env-{tenantId}-{envSlug}` (per-environment discovery) as additional networks. Sets `CAMELEER_AGENT_ROUTECONTROL_ENABLED` and `CAMELEER_AGENT_REPLAY_ENABLED` from `ResolvedContainerConfig` (default: true, configurable per environment/app via `defaultContainerConfig`/`containerConfig` JSONB). These are startup-only agent properties — changing them requires redeployment.
 - `DockerNetworkManager` — ensures bridge networks (cameleer-traefik, cameleer-env-{slug}), connects containers
 - `DockerEventMonitor` — persistent Docker event stream listener (die, oom, start, stop), updates deployment status
 - `TraefikLabelBuilder` — generates Traefik Docker labels for path-based or subdomain routing
@@ -149,11 +149,11 @@ java -jar cameleer3-server-app/target/cameleer3-server-app-1.0-SNAPSHOT.jar
 - Communication: receives HTTP POST data from agents (executions, diagrams, metrics, logs), serves SSE event streams for config push/commands (config-update, deep-trace, replay, route-control)
 - Environment filtering: all data queries (exchanges, dashboard stats, route metrics, agent events, correlation) filter by the selected environment. All commands (config-update, route-control, set-traced-processors, replay) target only agents in the selected environment when one is selected. `AgentRegistryService.findByApplicationAndEnvironment()` for environment-scoped command dispatch. Backend endpoints accept optional `environment` query parameter; null = all environments (backward compatible).
 - Maintains agent instance registry (in-memory) with states: LIVE -> STALE -> DEAD. Auto-heals from JWT `env` claim + heartbeat body on heartbeat/SSE after server restart (priority: heartbeat `environmentId` > JWT `env` claim > `"default"`). Capabilities and route states updated on every heartbeat (protocol v2). Route catalog falls back to ClickHouse stats for route discovery when registry has incomplete data.
-- Multi-tenancy: each server instance serves one tenant (configured via `CAMELEER_TENANT_ID`, default: `"default"`). Environments (dev/staging/prod) are first-class — agents send `environmentId` at registration and in heartbeats. JWT carries `env` claim for environment persistence across token refresh. PostgreSQL isolated via schema-per-tenant (`?currentSchema=tenant_{id}`). ClickHouse shared DB with `tenant_id` + `environment` columns, partitioned by `(tenant_id, toYYYYMM(timestamp))`.
+- Multi-tenancy: each server instance serves one tenant (configured via `CAMELEER_SERVER_TENANT_ID`, default: `"default"`). Environments (dev/staging/prod) are first-class — agents send `environmentId` at registration and in heartbeats. JWT carries `env` claim for environment persistence across token refresh. PostgreSQL isolated via schema-per-tenant (`?currentSchema=tenant_{id}`). ClickHouse shared DB with `tenant_id` + `environment` columns, partitioned by `(tenant_id, toYYYYMM(timestamp))`.
 - Storage: PostgreSQL for RBAC, config, and audit; ClickHouse for all observability data (executions, search, logs, metrics, stats, diagrams). ClickHouse schema migrations in `clickhouse/*.sql`, run idempotently on startup by `ClickHouseSchemaInitializer`. Use `IF NOT EXISTS` for CREATE and ADD PROJECTION.
 - Logging: ClickHouse JDBC set to INFO (`com.clickhouse`), HTTP client to WARN (`org.apache.hc.client5`) in application.yml
-- Security: JWT auth with RBAC (AGENT/VIEWER/OPERATOR/ADMIN roles), Ed25519 config signing (key derived deterministically from JWT secret via HMAC-SHA256), bootstrap token for registration. CORS: `CAMELEER_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` (comma-separated) overrides `CAMELEER_UI_ORIGIN` for multi-origin setups (e.g., reverse proxy). UI role gating: Admin sidebar/routes hidden for non-ADMIN; diagram toolbar and route control hidden for VIEWER. Read-only for VIEWER, editable for OPERATOR+. Role helpers: `useIsAdmin()`, `useCanControl()` in `auth-store.ts`. Route guard: `RequireAdmin` in `auth/RequireAdmin.tsx`. Last-ADMIN guard: system prevents removal of the last ADMIN role (409 Conflict on role removal, user deletion, group role removal). Password policy: min 12 chars, 3-of-4 character classes, no username match (enforced on user creation and admin password reset). Brute-force protection: 5 failed attempts -> 15 min lockout (tracked via `failed_login_attempts` / `locked_until` on users table). Token revocation: `token_revoked_before` column on users, checked in `JwtAuthenticationFilter`, set on password change.
-- OIDC: Optional external identity provider support (token exchange pattern). Configured via admin API/UI, stored in database (`server_config` table). Configurable `userIdClaim` (default `sub`) determines which id_token claim is used as the user identifier. Resource server mode: accepts external access tokens (Logto M2M) via JWKS validation when `CAMELEER_OIDC_ISSUER_URI` is set. `CAMELEER_OIDC_JWK_SET_URI` overrides JWKS discovery for container networking. `CAMELEER_OIDC_TLS_SKIP_VERIFY=true` disables TLS cert verification for OIDC calls (self-signed CAs). Scope-based role mapping via `SystemRole.normalizeScope()` (case-insensitive, strips `server:` prefix): `admin`/`server:admin` -> ADMIN, `operator`/`server:operator` -> OPERATOR, `viewer`/`server:viewer` -> VIEWER. SSO: when OIDC enabled, UI auto-redirects to provider with `prompt=none` for silent sign-in; falls back to `/login?local` on `login_required`, retries without `prompt=none` on `consent_required`. Logout always redirects to `/login?local` (via OIDC end_session or direct fallback) to prevent SSO re-login loops. Auto-signup provisions new OIDC users with default roles. System roles synced on every OIDC login via `syncOidcRoles` — always overwrites directly-assigned roles (falls back to `defaultRoles` when OIDC returns none); uses `getDirectRolesForUser` to avoid touching group-inherited roles. Group memberships are never touched. Supports ES384, ES256, RS256. Shared OIDC logic in `OidcProviderHelper` (discovery, JWK source, algorithm set).
+- Security: JWT auth with RBAC (AGENT/VIEWER/OPERATOR/ADMIN roles), Ed25519 config signing (key derived deterministically from JWT secret via HMAC-SHA256), bootstrap token for registration. CORS: `CAMELEER_SERVER_SECURITY_CORSALLOWEDORIGINS` (comma-separated) overrides `CAMELEER_SERVER_SECURITY_UIORIGIN` for multi-origin setups (e.g., reverse proxy). UI role gating: Admin sidebar/routes hidden for non-ADMIN; diagram toolbar and route control hidden for VIEWER. Read-only for VIEWER, editable for OPERATOR+. Role helpers: `useIsAdmin()`, `useCanControl()` in `auth-store.ts`. Route guard: `RequireAdmin` in `auth/RequireAdmin.tsx`. Last-ADMIN guard: system prevents removal of the last ADMIN role (409 Conflict on role removal, user deletion, group role removal). Password policy: min 12 chars, 3-of-4 character classes, no username match (enforced on user creation and admin password reset). Brute-force protection: 5 failed attempts -> 15 min lockout (tracked via `failed_login_attempts` / `locked_until` on users table). Token revocation: `token_revoked_before` column on users, checked in `JwtAuthenticationFilter`, set on password change.
+- OIDC: Optional external identity provider support (token exchange pattern). Configured via admin API/UI, stored in database (`server_config` table). Configurable `userIdClaim` (default `sub`) determines which id_token claim is used as the user identifier. Resource server mode: accepts external access tokens (Logto M2M) via JWKS validation when `CAMELEER_SERVER_SECURITY_OIDCISSUERURI` is set. `CAMELEER_SERVER_SECURITY_OIDCJWKSETURI` overrides JWKS discovery for container networking. `CAMELEER_SERVER_SECURITY_OIDCTLSSKIPVERIFY=true` disables TLS cert verification for OIDC calls (self-signed CAs). Scope-based role mapping via `SystemRole.normalizeScope()` (case-insensitive, strips `server:` prefix): `admin`/`server:admin` -> ADMIN, `operator`/`server:operator` -> OPERATOR, `viewer`/`server:viewer` -> VIEWER. SSO: when OIDC enabled, UI auto-redirects to provider with `prompt=none` for silent sign-in; falls back to `/login?local` on `login_required`, retries without `prompt=none` on `consent_required`. Logout always redirects to `/login?local` (via OIDC end_session or direct fallback) to prevent SSO re-login loops. Auto-signup provisions new OIDC users with default roles. System roles synced on every OIDC login via `syncOidcRoles` — always overwrites directly-assigned roles (falls back to `defaultRoles` when OIDC returns none); uses `getDirectRolesForUser` to avoid touching group-inherited roles. Group memberships are never touched. Supports ES384, ES256, RS256. Shared OIDC logic in `OidcProviderHelper` (discovery, JWK source, algorithm set).
 - OIDC role extraction: `OidcTokenExchanger` reads roles from the **access_token** first (JWT with `at+jwt` type, decoded by a separate processor), then falls back to id_token. `OidcConfig` includes `audience` (RFC 8707 resource indicator — included in both authorization request and token exchange POST body to trigger JWT access tokens) and `additionalScopes` (extra scopes for the SPA to request). The `rolesClaim` config points to the claim name in the token (e.g., `"roles"` for Custom JWT claims, `"realm_access.roles"` for Keycloak). All provider-specific configuration is external — no provider-specific code in the server.
 - User persistence: PostgreSQL `users` table, admin CRUD at `/api/v1/admin/users`
 - Usage analytics: ClickHouse `usage_events` table tracks authenticated UI requests, flushed every 5s
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ ClickHouse: `cameleer3-server-app/src/main/resources/clickhouse/init.sql` (run i
 
 - CI workflow: `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` — build -> docker -> deploy on push to main or feature branches
 - Build step skips integration tests (`-DskipITs`) — Testcontainers needs Docker daemon
-- Docker: multi-stage build (`Dockerfile`), `$BUILDPLATFORM` for native Maven on ARM64 runner, amd64 runtime. `docker-entrypoint.sh` imports `/certs/ca.pem` into JVM truststore before starting the app (supports custom CAs for OIDC discovery without `CAMELEER_OIDC_TLS_SKIP_VERIFY`).
+- Docker: multi-stage build (`Dockerfile`), `$BUILDPLATFORM` for native Maven on ARM64 runner, amd64 runtime. `docker-entrypoint.sh` imports `/certs/ca.pem` into JVM truststore before starting the app (supports custom CAs for OIDC discovery without `CAMELEER_SERVER_SECURITY_OIDCTLSSKIPVERIFY`).
 - `REGISTRY_TOKEN` build arg required for `cameleer3-common` dependency resolution
 - Registry: `gitea.siegeln.net/cameleer/cameleer3-server` (container images)
 - K8s manifests in `deploy/` — Kustomize base + overlays (main/feature), shared infra (PostgreSQL, ClickHouse, Logto) as top-level manifests
@@ -261,13 +261,13 @@ Deployments move through these statuses:
 
 - **Retention policy** per environment: configurable maximum number of JAR versions to keep. Older JARs are deleted automatically.
 - **Nightly cleanup job** (`JarRetentionJob`, Spring `@Scheduled` 03:00): purges JARs exceeding the retention limit and removes orphaned files not referenced by any app version. Skips versions currently deployed.
-- **Volume-based JAR mounting** for Docker-in-Docker setups: set `CAMELEER_JAR_DOCKER_VOLUME` to the Docker volume name that contains the JAR storage directory. When set, the orchestrator mounts this volume into the container instead of bind-mounting the host path (required when the SaaS container itself runs inside Docker and the host path is not accessible from sibling containers).
+- **Volume-based JAR mounting** for Docker-in-Docker setups: set `CAMELEER_SERVER_RUNTIME_JARDOCKERVOLUME` to the Docker volume name that contains the JAR storage directory. When set, the orchestrator mounts this volume into the container instead of bind-mounting the host path (required when the SaaS container itself runs inside Docker and the host path is not accessible from sibling containers).
 
 ### SaaS Multi-Tenant Network Isolation
 
 In SaaS mode, each tenant's server and its deployed apps are isolated at the Docker network level:
 
-- **Tenant network** (`cameleer-tenant-{slug}`) — primary internal bridge for all of a tenant's containers. Set as `CAMELEER_DOCKER_NETWORK` for the tenant's server instance. Tenant A's apps cannot reach tenant B's apps.
+- **Tenant network** (`cameleer-tenant-{slug}`) — primary internal bridge for all of a tenant's containers. Set as `CAMELEER_SERVER_RUNTIME_DOCKERNETWORK` for the tenant's server instance. Tenant A's apps cannot reach tenant B's apps.
 - **Shared services network** — server also connects to the shared infrastructure network (PostgreSQL, ClickHouse, Logto) and `cameleer-traefik` for HTTP routing.
 - **Tenant-scoped environment networks** (`cameleer-env-{tenantId}-{envSlug}`) — per-environment discovery is scoped per tenant, so `alpha-corp`'s "dev" environment network is separate from `beta-corp`'s "dev" environment network.