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cameleer-server/.planning/phases/04-security/04-VERIFICATION.md
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chore: rename cameleer3 to cameleer
Rename Java packages from com.cameleer3 to com.cameleer, module
directories from cameleer3-* to cameleer-*, and all references
throughout workflows, Dockerfiles, docs, migrations, and pom.xml.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-15 15:28:42 +02:00

12 KiB

phase, verified, status, score, gaps, human_verification
phase verified status score gaps human_verification
04-security 2026-03-11T20:50:00Z passed 10/10 must-haves verified

Phase 4: Security Verification Report

Phase Goal: All server communication is authenticated and integrity-protected, with JWT for API access and Ed25519 signatures for pushed configuration Verified: 2026-03-11T20:50:00Z Status: PASSED Re-verification: No — initial verification

Goal Achievement

Observable Truths

All truths drawn from PLAN frontmatter must_haves across plans 01, 02, and 03.

# Truth Status Evidence
1 Ed25519 keypair generated at startup; public key available as Base64 VERIFIED Ed25519SigningServiceImpl generates keypair via KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("Ed25519") in constructor; getPublicKeyBase64() returns Base64-encoded X.509 DER bytes
2 JwtService creates access tokens (1h) and refresh tokens (7d) with agentId, group, and type claims VERIFIED JwtServiceImpl.createToken() sets sub, group, type, iat, exp claims using Nimbus MACSigner/HS256; expiry from SecurityProperties
3 JwtService validates tokens and extracts agentId, distinguishing access vs refresh type VERIFIED validateToken() checks signature, expiration, and type claim; throws InvalidTokenException on any violation
4 BootstrapTokenValidator uses constant-time comparison and supports dual-token rotation VERIFIED Uses MessageDigest.isEqual() for both primary and previous token; null/blank guarded
5 Server fails fast on startup if CAMELEER_AUTH_TOKEN is not set VERIFIED SecurityBeanConfig registers an InitializingBean that throws IllegalStateException if bootstrapToken is null or blank
6 All API endpoints except health, register, and docs reject requests without valid JWT VERIFIED SecurityConfig permits /api/v1/health, /api/v1/agents/register, /api/v1/agents/*/refresh, Swagger docs, and /error; all other requests require authentication; SecurityFilterIT (6 tests) confirms
7 POST /register requires bootstrap token; returns JWT + refresh token + Ed25519 public key VERIFIED AgentRegistrationController.register() extracts and validates bootstrap token from Authorization: Bearer header, calls jwtService.createAccessToken/createRefreshToken and ed25519SigningService.getPublicKeyBase64(); RegistrationSecurityIT (3 tests) confirms
8 POST /agents/{id}/refresh accepts refresh token and returns new access JWT VERIFIED AgentRegistrationController.refresh() calls jwtService.validateRefreshToken(), verifies agent ID match, issues new access token; JwtRefreshIT (5 tests) confirms
9 All config-update, deep-trace, and replay SSE events carry a valid Ed25519 signature VERIFIED SseConnectionManager.onCommandReady() calls ssePayloadSigner.signPayload(command.payload()) before sendEvent(); SseSigningIT (2 tests) verify end-to-end signature against public key
10 Signature computed over original payload JSON, added as "signature" field VERIFIED SsePayloadSigner.signPayload() signs original string, parses JSON, adds "signature" field via ObjectNode.put(), re-serializes; SsePayloadSignerTest (7 tests) confirms including roundtrip verification

Score: 10/10 truths verified

Required Artifacts

Artifact Provides Status Details
cameleer-server-core/.../security/JwtService.java JWT interface: createAccessToken, createRefreshToken, validateAndExtractAgentId, validateRefreshToken VERIFIED 49 lines, substantive interface with 4 methods
cameleer-server-core/.../security/Ed25519SigningService.java Ed25519 interface: sign(payload), getPublicKeyBase64() VERIFIED 29 lines, substantive interface with 2 methods
cameleer-server-app/.../security/JwtServiceImpl.java Nimbus JOSE+JWT HMAC-SHA256 implementation VERIFIED 120 lines; uses MACSigner/MACVerifier, ephemeral 256-bit secret, correct claims
cameleer-server-app/.../security/Ed25519SigningServiceImpl.java JDK 17 Ed25519 KeyPairGenerator implementation VERIFIED 54 lines; KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("Ed25519"), Signature.getInstance("Ed25519"), Base64-encoded output
cameleer-server-app/.../security/BootstrapTokenValidator.java Constant-time bootstrap token validation with dual-token rotation VERIFIED 50 lines; MessageDigest.isEqual(), checks current and previous token, null/blank guard
cameleer-server-app/.../security/SecurityProperties.java Config binding with env var mapping VERIFIED 48 lines; @ConfigurationProperties(prefix="security"); all 4 fields with defaults
cameleer-server-app/.../security/SecurityBeanConfig.java Bean wiring with fail-fast validation VERIFIED 43 lines; @EnableConfigurationProperties, all 3 service beans, InitializingBean check
cameleer-server-app/.../security/JwtAuthenticationFilter.java OncePerRequestFilter extracting JWT from header or query param VERIFIED 72 lines; extracts from Authorization: Bearer then ?token= query param; sets SecurityContextHolder
cameleer-server-app/.../security/SecurityConfig.java SecurityFilterChain with permitAll for public paths, authenticated for rest VERIFIED 54 lines; stateless, CSRF disabled, correct permitAll list, addFilterBefore JwtAuthenticationFilter
cameleer-server-app/.../controller/AgentRegistrationController.java Updated register endpoint with bootstrap token validation, JWT issuance, public key; refresh endpoint VERIFIED 230 lines; both /register and /{id}/refresh endpoints fully wired
cameleer-server-app/.../agent/SsePayloadSigner.java Component that signs SSE command payloads VERIFIED 77 lines; @Component, signs then adds field, defensive null/blank handling
cameleer-server-app/.../agent/SseConnectionManager.java Updated onCommandReady with signing before sendEvent VERIFIED onCommandReady() calls ssePayloadSigner.signPayload(), parses to JsonNode to avoid double-quoting
cameleer-server-app/.../resources/application.yml Security config with env var mapping VERIFIED security.bootstrap-token: ${CAMELEER_AUTH_TOKEN:} and security.bootstrap-token-previous: ${CAMELEER_AUTH_TOKEN_PREVIOUS:} present
From To Via Status Details
JwtServiceImpl Nimbus JOSE+JWT MACSigner/MACVerifier HMAC-SHA256 signing with ephemeral 256-bit secret VERIFIED new MACSigner(secret), new MACVerifier(secret), SignedJWT — all present
Ed25519SigningServiceImpl JDK KeyPairGenerator/Signature Ed25519 algorithm from java.security VERIFIED KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("Ed25519") and Signature.getInstance("Ed25519") confirmed
BootstrapTokenValidator SecurityProperties reads token values from config properties VERIFIED MessageDigest.isEqual() used; reads properties.getBootstrapToken() and properties.getBootstrapTokenPrevious()
JwtAuthenticationFilter JwtService.validateAndExtractAgentId Filter delegates JWT validation to service VERIFIED jwtService.validateAndExtractAgentId(token) on line 46 of filter
SecurityConfig JwtAuthenticationFilter addFilterBefore VERIFIED addFilterBefore(new JwtAuthenticationFilter(jwtService, registryService), UsernamePasswordAuthenticationFilter.class)
AgentRegistrationController.register BootstrapTokenValidator.validate Validates bootstrap token before processing VERIFIED bootstrapTokenValidator.validate(bootstrapToken) before any processing
AgentRegistrationController.register JwtService.createAccessToken + createRefreshToken Issues tokens in registration response VERIFIED jwtService.createAccessToken(agentId, group) and jwtService.createRefreshToken(agentId, group) both called
SseConnectionManager.onCommandReady SsePayloadSigner.signPayload Signs payload before SSE delivery VERIFIED ssePayloadSigner.signPayload(command.payload()) on line 146 of SseConnectionManager
SsePayloadSigner Ed25519SigningService.sign Delegates signing to Ed25519 service VERIFIED ed25519SigningService.sign(jsonPayload) on line 60 of SsePayloadSigner

Requirements Coverage

Requirement Source Plan Description Status Evidence
SECU-01 (#23) Plan 02 All API endpoints (except health and register) require valid JWT Bearer token SATISFIED SecurityConfig enforces authentication on all non-public paths; SecurityFilterIT tests confirm 401/403 without JWT
SECU-02 (#24) Plan 02 JWT refresh flow via POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/refresh SATISFIED AgentRegistrationController.refresh() endpoint; JwtRefreshIT (5 tests) cover valid/invalid/wrong-type/mismatch/chain cases
SECU-03 (#25) Plan 01 Server generates Ed25519 keypair; public key delivered at registration SATISFIED Ed25519SigningServiceImpl generates keypair at construction; register() returns serverPublicKey from getPublicKeyBase64(); RegistrationSecurityIT confirms
SECU-04 (#26) Plan 03 All config-update and replay SSE payloads are signed with server's Ed25519 private key SATISFIED SsePayloadSigner signs all command payloads; SseConnectionManager.onCommandReady() calls it; SseSigningIT verifies end-to-end signature
SECU-05 (#27) Plans 01+02 Bootstrap token from CAMELEER_AUTH_TOKEN env var validates initial agent registration SATISFIED SecurityBeanConfig fails fast if missing; BootstrapTokenValidator checks with constant-time comparison; BootstrapTokenIT (4 tests) confirm

All 5 SECU requirements satisfied. No orphaned or unaccounted requirements.

Anti-Patterns Found

No anti-patterns detected in the security implementation files.

Scanned: JwtServiceImpl.java, Ed25519SigningServiceImpl.java, BootstrapTokenValidator.java, SecurityBeanConfig.java, JwtAuthenticationFilter.java, SecurityConfig.java, AgentRegistrationController.java, SsePayloadSigner.java, SseConnectionManager.java.

  • No TODO/FIXME/placeholder comments
  • No stub returns (empty arrays, null without reason, etc.)
  • No console.log-only implementations
  • No disabled wiring

One note: deferred-items.md documented 8 test failures at end of Plan 03. All are resolved — AgentSseControllerIT, AgentCommandControllerIT, and JwtRefreshIT all pass (verified by running full suite: 91 tests, 0 failures).

Human Verification Required

None. All security properties are verifiable programmatically:

  • JWT token signing and validation: covered by unit tests
  • Bootstrap token constant-time comparison: code inspection confirms MessageDigest.isEqual()
  • Ed25519 signature verification: SseSigningIT verifies end-to-end using Signature.getInstance("Ed25519") with public key
  • SecurityFilterChain endpoint protection: SecurityFilterIT exercises the full HTTP stack

Test Suite Result

Full mvn verify with CAMELEER_AUTH_TOKEN=test-bootstrap-token:

Suite Tests Result
Unit tests (JwtServiceTest, Ed25519SigningServiceTest, BootstrapTokenValidatorTest, SsePayloadSignerTest, ElkDiagramRendererTest) 36 PASS
Security ITs (SecurityFilterIT, BootstrapTokenIT, RegistrationSecurityIT, JwtRefreshIT, SseSigningIT) 20 PASS
All other controller/storage ITs 35 PASS
Total 91 PASS

Verified: 2026-03-11T20:50:00Z Verifier: Claude (gsd-verifier)