Rename Java packages from com.cameleer3 to com.cameleer, module directories from cameleer3-* to cameleer-*, and all references throughout workflows, Dockerfiles, docs, migrations, and pom.xml. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
12 KiB
phase, verified, status, score, gaps, human_verification
| phase | verified | status | score | gaps | human_verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 04-security | 2026-03-11T20:50:00Z | passed | 10/10 must-haves verified |
Phase 4: Security Verification Report
Phase Goal: All server communication is authenticated and integrity-protected, with JWT for API access and Ed25519 signatures for pushed configuration Verified: 2026-03-11T20:50:00Z Status: PASSED Re-verification: No — initial verification
Goal Achievement
Observable Truths
All truths drawn from PLAN frontmatter must_haves across plans 01, 02, and 03.
| # | Truth | Status | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Ed25519 keypair generated at startup; public key available as Base64 | VERIFIED | Ed25519SigningServiceImpl generates keypair via KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("Ed25519") in constructor; getPublicKeyBase64() returns Base64-encoded X.509 DER bytes |
| 2 | JwtService creates access tokens (1h) and refresh tokens (7d) with agentId, group, and type claims | VERIFIED | JwtServiceImpl.createToken() sets sub, group, type, iat, exp claims using Nimbus MACSigner/HS256; expiry from SecurityProperties |
| 3 | JwtService validates tokens and extracts agentId, distinguishing access vs refresh type | VERIFIED | validateToken() checks signature, expiration, and type claim; throws InvalidTokenException on any violation |
| 4 | BootstrapTokenValidator uses constant-time comparison and supports dual-token rotation | VERIFIED | Uses MessageDigest.isEqual() for both primary and previous token; null/blank guarded |
| 5 | Server fails fast on startup if CAMELEER_AUTH_TOKEN is not set | VERIFIED | SecurityBeanConfig registers an InitializingBean that throws IllegalStateException if bootstrapToken is null or blank |
| 6 | All API endpoints except health, register, and docs reject requests without valid JWT | VERIFIED | SecurityConfig permits /api/v1/health, /api/v1/agents/register, /api/v1/agents/*/refresh, Swagger docs, and /error; all other requests require authentication; SecurityFilterIT (6 tests) confirms |
| 7 | POST /register requires bootstrap token; returns JWT + refresh token + Ed25519 public key | VERIFIED | AgentRegistrationController.register() extracts and validates bootstrap token from Authorization: Bearer header, calls jwtService.createAccessToken/createRefreshToken and ed25519SigningService.getPublicKeyBase64(); RegistrationSecurityIT (3 tests) confirms |
| 8 | POST /agents/{id}/refresh accepts refresh token and returns new access JWT | VERIFIED | AgentRegistrationController.refresh() calls jwtService.validateRefreshToken(), verifies agent ID match, issues new access token; JwtRefreshIT (5 tests) confirms |
| 9 | All config-update, deep-trace, and replay SSE events carry a valid Ed25519 signature | VERIFIED | SseConnectionManager.onCommandReady() calls ssePayloadSigner.signPayload(command.payload()) before sendEvent(); SseSigningIT (2 tests) verify end-to-end signature against public key |
| 10 | Signature computed over original payload JSON, added as "signature" field | VERIFIED | SsePayloadSigner.signPayload() signs original string, parses JSON, adds "signature" field via ObjectNode.put(), re-serializes; SsePayloadSignerTest (7 tests) confirms including roundtrip verification |
Score: 10/10 truths verified
Required Artifacts
| Artifact | Provides | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
cameleer-server-core/.../security/JwtService.java |
JWT interface: createAccessToken, createRefreshToken, validateAndExtractAgentId, validateRefreshToken | VERIFIED | 49 lines, substantive interface with 4 methods |
cameleer-server-core/.../security/Ed25519SigningService.java |
Ed25519 interface: sign(payload), getPublicKeyBase64() | VERIFIED | 29 lines, substantive interface with 2 methods |
cameleer-server-app/.../security/JwtServiceImpl.java |
Nimbus JOSE+JWT HMAC-SHA256 implementation | VERIFIED | 120 lines; uses MACSigner/MACVerifier, ephemeral 256-bit secret, correct claims |
cameleer-server-app/.../security/Ed25519SigningServiceImpl.java |
JDK 17 Ed25519 KeyPairGenerator implementation | VERIFIED | 54 lines; KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("Ed25519"), Signature.getInstance("Ed25519"), Base64-encoded output |
cameleer-server-app/.../security/BootstrapTokenValidator.java |
Constant-time bootstrap token validation with dual-token rotation | VERIFIED | 50 lines; MessageDigest.isEqual(), checks current and previous token, null/blank guard |
cameleer-server-app/.../security/SecurityProperties.java |
Config binding with env var mapping | VERIFIED | 48 lines; @ConfigurationProperties(prefix="security"); all 4 fields with defaults |
cameleer-server-app/.../security/SecurityBeanConfig.java |
Bean wiring with fail-fast validation | VERIFIED | 43 lines; @EnableConfigurationProperties, all 3 service beans, InitializingBean check |
cameleer-server-app/.../security/JwtAuthenticationFilter.java |
OncePerRequestFilter extracting JWT from header or query param | VERIFIED | 72 lines; extracts from Authorization: Bearer then ?token= query param; sets SecurityContextHolder |
cameleer-server-app/.../security/SecurityConfig.java |
SecurityFilterChain with permitAll for public paths, authenticated for rest | VERIFIED | 54 lines; stateless, CSRF disabled, correct permitAll list, addFilterBefore JwtAuthenticationFilter |
cameleer-server-app/.../controller/AgentRegistrationController.java |
Updated register endpoint with bootstrap token validation, JWT issuance, public key; refresh endpoint | VERIFIED | 230 lines; both /register and /{id}/refresh endpoints fully wired |
cameleer-server-app/.../agent/SsePayloadSigner.java |
Component that signs SSE command payloads | VERIFIED | 77 lines; @Component, signs then adds field, defensive null/blank handling |
cameleer-server-app/.../agent/SseConnectionManager.java |
Updated onCommandReady with signing before sendEvent | VERIFIED | onCommandReady() calls ssePayloadSigner.signPayload(), parses to JsonNode to avoid double-quoting |
cameleer-server-app/.../resources/application.yml |
Security config with env var mapping | VERIFIED | security.bootstrap-token: ${CAMELEER_AUTH_TOKEN:} and security.bootstrap-token-previous: ${CAMELEER_AUTH_TOKEN_PREVIOUS:} present |
Key Link Verification
| From | To | Via | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|---|---|
JwtServiceImpl |
Nimbus JOSE+JWT MACSigner/MACVerifier | HMAC-SHA256 signing with ephemeral 256-bit secret | VERIFIED | new MACSigner(secret), new MACVerifier(secret), SignedJWT — all present |
Ed25519SigningServiceImpl |
JDK KeyPairGenerator/Signature | Ed25519 algorithm from java.security | VERIFIED | KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("Ed25519") and Signature.getInstance("Ed25519") confirmed |
BootstrapTokenValidator |
SecurityProperties | reads token values from config properties | VERIFIED | MessageDigest.isEqual() used; reads properties.getBootstrapToken() and properties.getBootstrapTokenPrevious() |
JwtAuthenticationFilter |
JwtService.validateAndExtractAgentId |
Filter delegates JWT validation to service | VERIFIED | jwtService.validateAndExtractAgentId(token) on line 46 of filter |
SecurityConfig |
JwtAuthenticationFilter |
addFilterBefore | VERIFIED | addFilterBefore(new JwtAuthenticationFilter(jwtService, registryService), UsernamePasswordAuthenticationFilter.class) |
AgentRegistrationController.register |
BootstrapTokenValidator.validate |
Validates bootstrap token before processing | VERIFIED | bootstrapTokenValidator.validate(bootstrapToken) before any processing |
AgentRegistrationController.register |
JwtService.createAccessToken + createRefreshToken |
Issues tokens in registration response | VERIFIED | jwtService.createAccessToken(agentId, group) and jwtService.createRefreshToken(agentId, group) both called |
SseConnectionManager.onCommandReady |
SsePayloadSigner.signPayload |
Signs payload before SSE delivery | VERIFIED | ssePayloadSigner.signPayload(command.payload()) on line 146 of SseConnectionManager |
SsePayloadSigner |
Ed25519SigningService.sign |
Delegates signing to Ed25519 service | VERIFIED | ed25519SigningService.sign(jsonPayload) on line 60 of SsePayloadSigner |
Requirements Coverage
| Requirement | Source Plan | Description | Status | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SECU-01 (#23) | Plan 02 | All API endpoints (except health and register) require valid JWT Bearer token | SATISFIED | SecurityConfig enforces authentication on all non-public paths; SecurityFilterIT tests confirm 401/403 without JWT |
| SECU-02 (#24) | Plan 02 | JWT refresh flow via POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/refresh |
SATISFIED | AgentRegistrationController.refresh() endpoint; JwtRefreshIT (5 tests) cover valid/invalid/wrong-type/mismatch/chain cases |
| SECU-03 (#25) | Plan 01 | Server generates Ed25519 keypair; public key delivered at registration | SATISFIED | Ed25519SigningServiceImpl generates keypair at construction; register() returns serverPublicKey from getPublicKeyBase64(); RegistrationSecurityIT confirms |
| SECU-04 (#26) | Plan 03 | All config-update and replay SSE payloads are signed with server's Ed25519 private key | SATISFIED | SsePayloadSigner signs all command payloads; SseConnectionManager.onCommandReady() calls it; SseSigningIT verifies end-to-end signature |
| SECU-05 (#27) | Plans 01+02 | Bootstrap token from CAMELEER_AUTH_TOKEN env var validates initial agent registration |
SATISFIED | SecurityBeanConfig fails fast if missing; BootstrapTokenValidator checks with constant-time comparison; BootstrapTokenIT (4 tests) confirm |
All 5 SECU requirements satisfied. No orphaned or unaccounted requirements.
Anti-Patterns Found
No anti-patterns detected in the security implementation files.
Scanned: JwtServiceImpl.java, Ed25519SigningServiceImpl.java, BootstrapTokenValidator.java, SecurityBeanConfig.java, JwtAuthenticationFilter.java, SecurityConfig.java, AgentRegistrationController.java, SsePayloadSigner.java, SseConnectionManager.java.
- No TODO/FIXME/placeholder comments
- No stub returns (empty arrays, null without reason, etc.)
- No console.log-only implementations
- No disabled wiring
One note: deferred-items.md documented 8 test failures at end of Plan 03. All are resolved — AgentSseControllerIT, AgentCommandControllerIT, and JwtRefreshIT all pass (verified by running full suite: 91 tests, 0 failures).
Human Verification Required
None. All security properties are verifiable programmatically:
- JWT token signing and validation: covered by unit tests
- Bootstrap token constant-time comparison: code inspection confirms
MessageDigest.isEqual() - Ed25519 signature verification:
SseSigningITverifies end-to-end usingSignature.getInstance("Ed25519")with public key - SecurityFilterChain endpoint protection:
SecurityFilterITexercises the full HTTP stack
Test Suite Result
Full mvn verify with CAMELEER_AUTH_TOKEN=test-bootstrap-token:
| Suite | Tests | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Unit tests (JwtServiceTest, Ed25519SigningServiceTest, BootstrapTokenValidatorTest, SsePayloadSignerTest, ElkDiagramRendererTest) | 36 | PASS |
| Security ITs (SecurityFilterIT, BootstrapTokenIT, RegistrationSecurityIT, JwtRefreshIT, SseSigningIT) | 20 | PASS |
| All other controller/storage ITs | 35 | PASS |
| Total | 91 | PASS |
Verified: 2026-03-11T20:50:00Z Verifier: Claude (gsd-verifier)